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Abstract
We estimate the long-run eﬀects of oil wealth on development by exploiting spatial
variation in sedimentary basins—areas where petroleum can potentially form. Instru-
mental variables estimates indicate that oil production impedes democracy and ﬁscal
capacity development, increases corruption, and raises GDP per capita without signiﬁ-
cantly harming the non-resource sectors of the economy. We ﬁnd no evidence that oil
production increases internal armed conﬂict, coup aempts, or political purges. In several
speciﬁcations failure to account for endogeneity leads to substantial underestimation of the
adverse eﬀects of oil, suggesting that countries with higher-quality political institutions
and greater ﬁscal capacity disproportionately select into oil production. Countries that
had weak executive constraints from 1950–1965 experienced the largest adverse eﬀects of
oil on democracy and ﬁscal capacity, yet they beneﬁted the most in terms of GDP. Overall,
the results conﬁrm the existence of a political resource curse, while rejecting the economic
resource curse hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Does natural resource abundance promote or hinder economic and political development? De-
spite decades of research, the question remains largely unresolved.1 Much of the disagreement
owes to the diﬃculty of identifying exogenous variation in resource wealth.2 Country-level
resource exploration and extraction are endogenous to political, institutional, and economic
conditions.3 Recent contributions to the literature have exploited subnational data and short-
term ﬂuctuations in world resource prices in order to identify short-run causal eﬀects of
resource income.4 However, several important outcomes, such as the political regime and
ﬁscal capacity of the central government, require analysis at the national level. Furthermore,
the interaction between resource wealth and economic and political variables may develop
over long periods of time. Political and ﬁscal institutions develop and consolidate over many
years—as do their eﬀects.5 In addition, both the “greed” and “grievance” motives for conﬂict
(Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004) can be deeply rooted in the presence of resource endowments.
erefore, the long-run eﬀects of natural resources are of great interest. Understanding how
natural resource wealth aﬀects long-run development will inform not only domestic resource
policy (e.g., royalties and drilling rights), but also federal transfer policy and foreign aid, as
natural resource revenue and other forms of non-tax revenue are believed to have similar
eﬀects (e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-erol, 2008; Brollo et al., 2013).
is paper examines the long-run eﬀects of oil wealth on development using a new identiﬁ-
1Early studies argued that resource wealth lowered economic growth via the Dutch Disease (Corden and
Neary, 1982; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1999, 2001), but recent studies call the Dutch Disease hypothesis into
question, showing that oil discovery and production can cause positive spillovers for manufacturing and boost
aggregate investment and employment (Michaels, 2011; Allco and Keniston, 2017; Arezki, Ramey, and Sheng,
2016). Arezki et al. (2016) and Smith (2015) both present evidence that oil wealth raises GDP, using cross-country
panel data. Inﬂuential early studies in the political science literature claimed that resource rents promoted
authoritarianism (Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). However, Herb (2005) and Haber and Menaldo
(2011) argue that there is no robust relationship between oil rents and democracy. See, however, responses to
the laer study by Andersen and Ross (2014) and Wiens, Poast, and Clark (2014). Alexeev and Conrad (2009)
argue that the negative cross-sectional association between oil and the quality of institutions disappears aer
controlling for (instrumented) GDP. Bru¨ckner, Ciccone, and Tesei (2012) present evidence that oil exports improve
democratic institutions. For recent surveys of the resource curse literature, see Ross (2015), van der Ploeg (2011),
Frankel (2010), and Torvik (2009). See Cust and Poelhekke (2015) for a survey of the subnational evidence for the
resource curse.
2See, for example, the discussions in Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010).
3David and Wright (1997) argue that the United States became the world’s premier mineral producer from
1870–1910 not because of a fortuitous mineral endowment relative to other countries, but because its superior
technology and institutions allowed it to more eﬃciently extract resources. Bohn and Deacon (2000) ﬁnd that
democratic institutions and political stability positively aﬀect investment in oil exploration. Cust and Harding
(2017) show that when oil is potentially located on a national border, 95 percent more exploratory drilling occurs
in the country with relatively beer institutions.
4Subnational studies include Vicente (2010), Michaels (2011), Litschig (2012), Monteiro and Ferraz (2012),
Arago´n and Rud (2013), Brollo, Nannicini, Peroi, and Tabellini (2013), Caselli and Michaels (2013), Dube and
Vargas (2013), Allco and Keniston (2017), Arago´n and Rud (2016), Arago´n, Rud, and Toews (2018), and Carreri
and Dube (2017). For empirical strategies that exploit price shocks, see Bru¨ckner et al. (2012), Dube and Vargas
(2013), Andersen, Johannesen, Lassen, and Paltseva (2017), Caselli and Tesei (2016), and Carreri and Dube (2017).
5See Besley and Persson (2011) for a model of ﬁscal capacity as a stock variable, and see Persson and Tabellini
(2009) on the implications of democratic capital.
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cation strategy that exploits the geological characteristics of countries. Hydrocarbons—notably
crude oil and natural gas—are produced by the heating and compression of organic maer
buried within sedimentary basins. Our instrumental variables approach uses new data on the
spatial distribution of sedimentary basins to isolate exogenous cross-country variation in oil
wealth.6
Addressing endogeneity is crucial in this context, because the sign of the bias of ordinary
least squares is a priori ambiguous. If wealthier or more democratic countries aract greater
private investment in resource exploration and production, perhaps due to their stronger
property-rights protections, then the estimated eﬀect of resource wealth on development
will be biased upwards (Cust and Harding, 2017). On the other hand, if low-income or less
democratic countries have more lax regulation of the resource sector or are governed by
politicians who personally beneﬁt from rapid extraction rates, then the estimate will be biased
downwards (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006).
Other studies have used instrumental variables (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; van der
Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010; Tsui, 2011; Borge, Parmer, and Torvik, 2015), price shocks (Bru¨ckner
et al., 2012; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Andersen et al., 2017; Caselli and Tesei, 2016; Carreri and
Dube, 2017), and giant oil ﬁeld discoveries (Lei and Michaels, 2014; Smith, 2015; Arezki et al.,
2016) to estimate the causal eﬀects of natural resource abundance. Panel models have the
advantage of controlling for unit ﬁxed eﬀects but potentially present two disadvantages: they
typically only recover short-run eﬀects, and they may be biased if institutions inﬂuence the
timing of resource discoveries and production.
Consistent estimation of long-run eﬀects requires a source of cross-country variation
in resource wealth that is orthogonal to institutional quality and other important country
characteristics. Previous cross-country studies have used initial subsoil assets as an instrument
for resource wealth (e.g., van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010; Tsui, 2011). However, these
measures of known resource endowment could depend on exploration eﬀort, which endoge-
nously responds to economic and political conditions. We aim to improve upon this strategy
by focusing on geological features that cannot respond to economic or political factors.
e instrumental variables estimates indicate that an increase in average annual oil produc-
tion from 1966–2008 signiﬁcantly reduces the level of democracy in 2008 as well as the average
level of democracy from 1966–2008. Increasing oil production also leads to more corruption
and reduces average tax revenue as a share of GDP from 2000–2008. e corresponding OLS
estimates understate the negative eﬀects of oil, suggesting that countries with beer political
institutions and greater state capacity disproportionately select into oil production. e ev-
idence on internal armed conﬂict, coup aempts, and purges is less conclusive. Finally, we
ﬁnd evidence that oil production raises GDP and does not signiﬁcantly harm the non-resource
sectors of the economy. e results are consistent with recent research showing that oil nega-
6Bartik, Currie, Greenstone, and Kniel (2017) use an index of geological suitability for hydrocarbons accessible
by fracking to predict the prevalence of fracking at the U.S. county level.
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tively impacts political institutions without leading to noticeably worse economic outcomes
on average (Ross, 2012). e results are robust to controlling for region ﬁxed eﬀects and a wide
variety of geographic covariates.
e potential weakness of our empirical strategy is that, even aer controlling for geo-
graphic confounders, predetermined correlates of development may still be correlated with
our instrument, owing to the lumpy distribution of sedimentary basins around the world. We
take this concern very seriously and explore the sensitivity of our estimates to controlling
for other predetermined characteristics. Out of nine important predetermined characteristics
considered, only one—the percentage of the population that was Muslim in 1950—is strongly
correlated with the instrument. Controlling for this variable aenuates the estimated eﬀects
of oil production on institutions (which remain negative), strengthens the estimated positive
eﬀects on GDP, and has lile impact on the estimated eﬀects on conﬂict and tax revenue.
While the instrument is not perfect, placebo tests reassuringly show no signiﬁcant correlation
between sedimentary basins and democracy or population density in years when world oil
production was minimal.
Several studies have argued that natural resources have heterogeneous eﬀects which
depend on country-speciﬁc factors, such as institutions.7 Following this literature, we test for
heterogeneous eﬀects, ﬁnding that the negative long-run eﬀects of oil wealth on democracy and
tax revenue are concentrated in the subsample of countries with weak institutional constraints
on executive decision-making from 1950–1965. Interestingly, countries with weak executive
constraints from 1950–1965 beneﬁted the most from oil in terms of income, probably reﬂecting
the fact that lower-income countries have the highest potential GDP gains from oil (Smith,
2015). We view the evidence on heterogeneous eﬀects as suggestive rather than causal, because
initial institutions may be correlated with unobserved country characteristics which aﬀect
modern-day outcomes.
e results on heterogeneous eﬀects of oil on democracy are most similar to those of Tsui
(2011) and Caselli and Tesei (2016), who ﬁnd that resource wealth causes non-democracies to
become less democratic but has no eﬀect on the political regime in democracies. Unlike those
studies, however, we condition on initial rather than contemporary political institutions to
(partially) alleviate concerns about the endogeneity of political institutions. eory predicts that
natural resource wealth will have heterogeneous eﬀects on corruption and conﬂict depending
on the quality of institutions (Bhaacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2011).
However, our empirical results provide lile support for these predictions. Our ﬁnding that oil
wealth reduces ﬁscal capacity is related to the theoretical predictions of Besley and Persson
(2009a, 2010); Besley and Persson (2011) and is consistent with previous empirical studies
7For the argument that the eﬀect of natural resources on income depends on the quality of institutions, see,
e.g., Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006), Robinson et al. (2006),
and Boschini, Peersson, and Roine (2007). Other studies emphasize that resource rents inﬂuence politician
behavior in diﬀerent ways depending on preexisting political institutions; see, e.g., Aslaksen and Torvik (2006),
Bhaacharyya and Hodler (2010), Tsui (2011), Andersen and Aslaksen (2013), and Caselli and Tesei (2016).
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(Jensen, 2011; Ca´rdenas, Ramı´rez, and Tuzemen, 2011). To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper
to empirically test how the eﬀect of oil on tax revenue depends on initial institutions. Recent
research on ﬁscal capacity and natural resources emphasizes the role of the marginal value of
public funds (Besley and Persson, 2011; Jensen, 2011), however our results are more consistent
with a “rentier state” model (Mahdavy, 1970; Ross, 2001) which focuses on an autocrat’s ability
to use public ﬁnance to produce a quiescent population.
e paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on petroleum
geology and describes the construction of the instrumental variable. Section 3 describes
the data, Section 4 describes the identiﬁcation strategy, Section 5 presents the main results,
Section 6 discusses the evidence of heterogeneous eﬀects, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Petroleum Geology and Instrumental Variables
2.1 Formation of Hydrocarbons
is section provides a brief overview of petroleum geology and deﬁnes the instrumental
variable. ere are ﬁve geological prerequisites for oil reservoir formation. First, there must be
a source rock, a sedimentary rock rich in organic material deposited by algae and zooplankton
millions of years ago. Source rocks form within a sedimentary basin—a region of the Earth’s
crust characterized by prolonged subsidence, in which tectonic movements cause the surface
area to sink and sediments from surrounding regions to ﬁll in the depressed area (Southard,
2007). Extreme heat and pressure convert the buried organic material into hydrocarbons,
notably natural gas and crude oil (Kvenvolden, 2006). Second, a migration pathway must
connect the source rock to an area where the reservoir will form. For example, this migration
pathway may be a fracture caused by seismic activity. ird, a reservoir rock must be located
along the migration pathway. is highly porous and permeable rock, usually a sandstone
or carbonate, collects and absorbs the migrating hydrocarbons (Chen, 2009). Fourth, a highly
impermeable caprock must seal the hydrocarbons within the reservoir rock, preventing the
hydrocarbons from leaking to the surface and dissipating. e ﬁnal requirement is the presence
of what is known as a trap, which concentrates the hydrocarbons in speciﬁc locations where
they can be exploited (Allen and Allen, 2005).8 See the online appendix for illustrations.
2.2 Sedimentary Basin Classiﬁcation
e Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013) Tellus GIS database provides the name, location, description,
and geological classiﬁcation of every onshore and oﬀshore sedimentary basin. See Figure
1 for a map of the basins. Geologists rely on three general techniques to collect data on
sedimentary basins: (i) surface mapping, (ii) core sampling, and (iii) subsurface geophysics
8I am indebted to Mike Waite, a former geophysicist at Chevron, for explaining this process to me.
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such as seismic proﬁling (Southard, 2007). Aerial photographs provide a base map of the
surface, and survey work on the ground complements the photographs in the construction of
surface maps (Marjoribanks, 2010, ch. 2). Core sampling involves the removal of a cylindrical
piece of subsurface material using a drill. Geologists use seismic air guns to initiate seismic
waves underground. ey use seismic detectors to record the arrival of the waves at diﬀerent
points under the surface. Geologists then use the data collected by the seismic detectors to
draw seismic proﬁles (Britannica, 2015).
Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013) divides sedimentary basins into 24 classiﬁcation groups
according to their plate-tectonic environment, primary mechanism of subsidence, and other
details regarding the nature of faulting and subsidence and the relative location of the basin
on the tectonic plate. Each basin forms in one of three general plate-tectonic environments.
e ﬁrst is a divergent environment, in which adjacent tectonic plates pull away from each
other. e second is a convergent environment, in which tectonic plates collide head on,
causing one plate to pass underneath the other in a process known as subduction. Convergent
environments are further divided according to whether they feature continental plates, oceanic
plates, or both. e third is a wrench environment, in which adjacent tectonic plates move
in opposite, parallel directions, rubbing alongside each other. e mechanism of subsidence
is mechanical (a.k.a., “tectonic”), thermal, or thermo-mechanical. Mechanical subsidence is
caused by the movement of tectonic plates due to faulting. ermal subsidence is caused by
the thickening of the Earth’s crust due to cooling of the underlying mantle, which causes the
crust to become denser than its surroundings. ermo-mechanical subsidence is caused by
some combination of the aforementioned mechanical and thermal processes.
Table A.3 in the online appendix lists the name, classiﬁcation code, and plate-tectonic
environment (“sub-regime”) of each of the 24 Fugro Robertson basin types. e classiﬁcation
code consists of two or three elements. e ﬁrst element indicates the general plate-tectonic
environment. It takes the value of “D” for “Divergent,” “C” for “Convergent,” and “W” for
“Wrench.” For codes consisting of three elements, the second element indicates the involvement
of continental tectonic plates, oceanic tectonic plates, or both. A second-element value of 1
indicates the presence of two continental plates, 2 indicates the presence of one continental
and one oceanic plate, and 3 indicates the presence of two oceanic plates. For example, a basin
with code starting with “C.1” exists in an environment in which two continental plates are
converging, while a basin with code starting with “C.2” exists in an environment in which a
continental plate and an oceanic plate are converging. For codes consisting of three elements,
the third element indicates the location of the basin relative to the plates and areas of faulting.
For example, codes ending in “F” indicate foreland basins, which are formed adjacent to
a mountain range caused by the subduction of two plates. e code “C.1.F” corresponds
to a foreland basin formed in the context of two continental plates colliding, while “C.3.F”
corresponds to a foreland basin formed from the collision of two oceanic plates. To give
another example, codes ending in “E” indicate extensional basins, which are formed in areas
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characterized by the stretching of the crust or lithosphere. For codes consisting of only two
elements, the second element indicates the location of the basin relative to the plates and
areas of faulting. In sum, the ﬁnal element of the code indicates local characteristics of the
basin formation, while the preceding elements of the code indicate global characteristics of
the plate-tectonic environment.
Figure A.18 in the online appendix displays diagrams for two common basin types. e
ﬁrst basin type, C.1.F or “peripheral foreland basin,” exists in a convergent plate-tectonic
environment and is characterized by a mechanical subsidence mechanism. Peripheral foreland
basins are found adjacent to mountain ranges formed by the subduction of two continental
plates. Large peripheral foreland basins exist in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula,
adjacent to the Zagros mountains in Iran. e second basin type, D.4 or “passive margin
basin,” forms within a divergent plate-tectonic environment and features a thermal subsidence
mechanism. Passive margins occupy areas where an oceanic plate and a continental plate have
diverged, such as the eastern coastlines of the Americas and all coastlines of Africa, among
other places.
2.3 Instrument Construction
e next task is to specify the candidate instrument sets. e composition of each instrument
set depends on two choices. e ﬁrst choice is how to aggregate the 24 Fugro Robertson
basin categories into a smaller number of exhaustive and mutually exclusive basin categories.
Aggregating the basin categories is reasonable a priori as many of the disaggregated categories
account for a very small fraction of the earth’s surface area and thus are unlikely to have much
predictive power. e second choice is which aggregate basin categories to include in the set
of instruments. Section 4 describes the instrument selection procedure.
We pursue two approaches to basin aggregation. e ﬁrst is based on the global characteris-
tics of the basin environment—the general plate-tectonic environment and primary mechanism
of subsidence. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013) provides a grouping that assigns each basin type
to one of ﬁve plate-tectonic environments—divergent, convergent continent-continent, con-
vergent ocean-continent, convergent ocean-ocean, and wrench—and one of three subsidence
categories—mechanical, thermo-mechanical, and thermal. is method results in eight groups
of basin types that actually exist, as shown in Table A.4 in the online appendix.9
e second approach is based on the local characteristics of the basin as indicated by
the ﬁnal element of the Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013) code. As already mentioned, the local
characteristics involve the location of the basin relative to the plates and areas of faulting. is
9Basins with convergent ocean-ocean tectonics and thermal subsidence covered only 1,331 square kilometers
of sovereign area among countries in the sample, which is several orders of magnitude less than any other basin
group deﬁned by the tectonic environment and subsidence mechanism. ese basins exists in essentially just
one country included in the sample. (St. Kis and Nevis contains 1,329 square kilometers of this basin type,
while Venezuela contains two square kilometers.) We therefore combine these basins with those with convergent
ocean-ocean tectonics and mechanical subsidence.
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approach produces ten basin groups, as shown in Table A.5 in the online appendix. e online
appendix provides maps of the aggregated basin categories.
We assign values of each aggregate basin type to countries by calculating the log of the
sovereign area (in square kilometers) per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 covered by the basin.10
Sovereign territory is inclusive of maritime boundaries. Data on country land borders are from
Erle and Gilles (2013), and data on maritime borders are from the Flanders Marine Institute
(2013).11
3 Other Data Sources
is section describes the other data sources used in the empirical analysis. e sample
period is 1966–2008.12 Data on oil production, our primary measure of oil wealth, come from
Ross (2013), who cleaned and compiled data from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s International Energy Statistics, the World Bank, and the BP
Statistical Review. is dataset covers 172 countries, of which 96 have produced oil, from
1932–2011.13 Oil production is measured as the log of average annual metric tons per 1000
inhabitants from 1966–2008.
To ensure that the basin instrument satisﬁes the exclusion restriction, we include controls
for geographic features that are possibly correlated with both sedimentary basins and economic
and political outcomes. e basin variable will naturally be correlated with the physical size
of the country, so we include a control for total land area calculated from GIS data. Gallup,
Sachs, and Mellinger (1998) show that countries with more land in the tropics and less access
to waterways tended to grow more slowly over their sample period. We use their data to
construct a measure of land area in the tropics. Data on country coastline are obtained from
the CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2015). We also use data on the area of mountainous land
from Fearon and Laitin (2003), who argue that mountainous terrain is associated with higher
levels of insurgency and civil war. Finally, we control for soil quality, which could inﬂuence
development directly through its eﬀect on agricultural productivity, or indirectly through
the division of labor and the evolution of gender norms (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013).
We use the FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database (Fischer, van Velthuizen,
Shah, and Nachtergaele, 2002) to calculate each country’s land area containing “good” soil.14
10All geographic variables are normalized by population in 1960, prior to the sample period, because population
may be endogenous to oil production through changes in migration (Michaels, 2011) or fertility (Ross, 2008).
11All geographic calculations use the Cylindrical Equal Area projected coordinate system, which preserves
area measure.
12e sample ends in 2008 to avoid the depths of the Great Recession.
13An advantage of this dataset is that it also includes information on oil exports as well as natural gas production
and exports. Natural gas oen accumulates near crude oil reservoirs, so the sedimentary basin instrument also
predicts natural gas endowment. e empirical analysis focuses on oil production to facilitate comparison to past
studies, however the results are very similar when the explanatory variable is oil and gas production.
14e GAEZ database divides zones according to the moisture regime (dry, moist, sub-humid, or humid) and
soil quality (good, moderate, or poor). We deﬁne “good soil” as soil with “good” quality falling in any of the
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Soil quality depends on nutrient availability, nutrient retention capacity, rooting conditions,
oxygen availability, presence of excess salts, toxicity, and workability.
As with the Basin variables, all geographic controls measuring surface area are expressed
as the log of the surface area (in square kilometers) per 1000 inhabitants in 1960. e coastline
variable is expressed as the log of the coastline (in kilometers) per 1000 inhabitants in 1960.15
Data on population come from Maddison (2013).
We measure democracy using the standard POLITY2 index from the Polity IV database
(Marshall and Gurr, 2014), which depends on qualities of executive recruitment, constraints
on executive authority, and political competition. e index takes integer values from −10 to
10. POLITY2 codes cases of foreign “interruption” as missing and cases of “interregnum,” or
anarchy, as zero. Furthermore, the POLITY2 score is prorated starting from zero during periods
of transition following interruption or interregnum. is can give the false impression that,
say, a period of anarchy in an autocratic country represents a movement towards democracy.
We follow the recent literature (Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011; Caselli and Tesei, 2016) and
code periods of interregnum as missing. Furthermore, we prorate the score during periods of
transition starting from the most recent non-missing POLITY2 score. We normalize POLITY2
to take values between zero and one, with one being the most democratic. Two diﬀerent
democracy outcomes are used: (1) democracy in 2008 and (2) average democracy from 1966–
2008 in years in which the country was independent. emeasure of executive constraints is the
XCONST variable from the Polity IV database, also normalized to take values between zero and
one. is variable measures the “extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making
powers of chief executives,” where the constraints can be imposed by any accountability group
(Marshall and Gurr, 2014).
Data on corruption and conﬂict come from several sources. Our corruption measure comes
from the Political Risk Services (PRS) and focuses on corruption within the political system.16
e index ranges from zero to six, with higher numbers indicating less corruption. We recode
the corruption variable to be six minus the PRS index, so that the new variable ranges from
zero to six, with higher numbers indicating more corruption. We measure corruption in 2008.
ree variables capture diﬀerent aspects of political conﬂict. First, we use the UCDP/PRIO
dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002) to calculate the number
of internal or internationalized internal armed conﬂicts per year in which the country was
independent from 1966–2008. e dataset counts only conﬂicts in which the government is a
party and which involve at least 25 bale-related deaths. Second, we use the Polity IV database
(Marshall and Marshall, 2016) to count the number of (failed or successful) coup aempts per
moisture regimes. We use the most recent version of the database available, version 3.0.
15 Due to the presence of zero values, each “log” transformation in the empirical analysis is in fact a diﬀerentiable
and monotonic transformation h(w) = log(w) forw > w0 and h(w) = log(w0) − 1 +w/w0 forw ≤ w0. In practice
w0 is set equal to the minimum positive value of the random variable observed in the sample.
16According to the Political Risk Services, the measure accounts for excessive patronage, nepotism, job
reservations, ‘favor-for-favors,’ secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business.
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year in which the country was independent from 1966–2008.17 Finally, we use the dataset by
Banks and Wilson (2016) to calculate the number of purges per year in which the country was
independent from 1966–2008.18
Revenue data come from the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, compiled by Prichard,
Cobham, and Goodall (2014) on behalf of the International Centre for Tax and Development
(ICTD). e series covers the period 1980–2013 for 204 countries, although a nontrivial amount
of data are missing, particularly in earlier years. Previously available cross-country tax and
revenue datasets were plagued by many missing observations, inconsistent accounting deﬁ-
nitions, and inadequate decomposition of tax and revenue by source, among other problems.
In particular, accounting treatment of natural resource revenue is notoriously variable across
countries, making cross-country analysis diﬃcult. e authors of the ICTD dataset combined
and manually cleaned data from several international databases, improving data coverage
and consistency. For the purposes of this paper, the ICTD dataset is particularly valuable
because it is based on a standardized approach to revenue from natural resources.19 We focus
on two government revenue outcomes: total revenue and tax revenue. All revenue variables
exclude social contributions. Total revenue is the sum of all tax and non-tax revenue. Crucially,
total revenue includes both resource tax revenue (e.g., corporate taxes paid by private natural-
resource ﬁrms) and non-tax resource revenue (e.g., royalties paid by private companies and
proﬁts from state-owned natural-resource companies). Following the ICTD classiﬁcation, tax
revenue is deﬁned as the sum of all non-resource tax revenue.20 To maximize sample size and
smooth out ﬂuctuations due to business cycles, revenue variables are measured as the log of
their average share of GDP from 2000–2008.
Fiscal capacity—the state’s maximum administrative ability to collect tax revenue—is
unobservable. Following the empirical ﬁscal-capacity literature (Besley and Persson, 2011;
Jensen, 2011; Ca´rdenas et al., 2011), we use tax revenue as a proxy for ﬁscal capacity. Tax
revenue collection requires investment in tax administration and entails higher information
and enforcement costs than other forms of revenue, such natural-resource royalties (Besley
and Persson, 2011). We thus expect variation in tax revenue to largely reﬂect variation in the
state’s administrative capacity to collect taxes.
We measure the log of GDP per capita in 2008 (constant 2011 international dollars) using
17A coup is deﬁned as a “forceful seizure of executive authority and oﬃce by a dissident/opposition faction
within the country’s ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership
and the policies of the prior regime (although not necessarily in the nature of regime authority or mode of
governance)” (Marshall and Marshall, 2016).
18A purge is deﬁned as “any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political opposition within the
ranks of the regime or the opposition” (Banks and Wilson, 2016).
19Despite the extensive eﬀorts made to construct a reliable dataset, some problems remain due to the limitations
of primary sources. In some cases the data appear not credible, and in other cases it is impossible to isolate
natural resource revenue from other types of revenue. ese problematic observations are ﬂagged in the dataset
and are excluded from the empirical analysis.
20is deﬁnition is conceptually appealing, as we are interested in how resource wealth aﬀects investments in
state capacity. Taxing a few large resource ﬁrms requires much less administrative capacity than, say, enforcing a
personal income tax.
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the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We construct sub-components of GDP per
capita—non-oil GDP per capita, non-oil/gas GDP per capita, non-resource GDP per capita,
and manufacturing GDP per capita—using GDP per capita and GDP share data from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. For example, non-resource GDP per capita
is constructed by multiplying GDP per capita by one minus the share of natural resource
rents (value of production less production costs) in GDP. Similarly, manufacturing GDP is
constructed by multiplying GDP per capita by the share of manufacturing value added in GDP.
Subcomponents of GDP per capita are also measured in 2008 and in log scale.
4 Identiﬁcation Strategy
4.1 Estimating Equations
is section describes the identiﬁcation strategy. We estimate the eﬀect of oil wealth on
country outcomes using sedimentary basin areas as instruments. e estimating equations are
ycr = βOilcr + δ
′xcr + αr + εcr
Oilcr = pi
′Basincr + φ
′xcr + λr + ξcr ,
where c indexes countries and r indexes regions. e variable y represents a country-level
outcome, such as level of democracy or tax revenue. Oil is a measure of average annual oil
production per capita over the period of interest.21
Basin is a possibly multidimensional vector of sedimentary basin measures. e main
threat to identiﬁcation is the possibility that some geographic features omied from the model
are correlated with elements ofBasin and development outcomes. We address this concern
by controlling for several geographic characteristics that have been shown to be correlated with
economic and political development.22 e vector x comprises total land area, mountainous
area, tropical area, good-soil area, and length of coastline. e parameter αr represents an
unobserved region-speciﬁc determinant of development.23 We eliminate the potential bias
produced by αr by including region indicator variables.
e ﬁrst identifying assumption of the model is that, conditional on the set of geographic
covariates,Basin is independent of potential development outcomes and potential selection
into oil discovery. Informally, this assumption says that Basin does not have a direct
eﬀect on development outside the channel of oil discovery, and that basin prevalence is not
21We focus on the eﬀect of oil production, because the results are very similar for other measures of oil
abundance, such as oil discovery, oil reserves, oil endowment, and oil and gas production. ese results are
available upon request.
22See Gallup et al. (1998) for geographic correlates of economic development, and see Fearon and Laitin (2003)
for the correlation between mountainous terrain and insurgency.
23e regions are Africa, Europe/Northern America/Oceania, Asia, and Latin America/Caribbean.
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systematically related to country exploration technology or any other propensity for discovery,
aer controlling for geographic covariates. Given that we control for geographic features
that are both plausibly correlated with Basin and may aﬀect development outcomes, the
ﬁrst assumption is likely to hold. e second identifying assumption is that increasing the
prevalence of sedimentary basins would never cause a country to produce less oil, for example
because of lower exploration eﬀort. is is the familiar monotonicity assumption (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994; Angrist and Imbens, 1995). It is likely to hold in all but the most implausible
scenarios. e ﬁnal identifying assumption is thatBasin and Oil have non-zero correlation.
If these assumptions hold, then the two-stage least squares estimand identiﬁes the average
causal eﬀect of Oil on y in countries where a marginal change in basin area induces a change
in Oil (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).
Our identiﬁcation strategy is related to studies which use a measure of the initial resource
endowment as an instrument for resource wealth over a speciﬁc time period (van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke, 2010; Tsui, 2011). e resource endowment of a country is typically measured as
the sum of cumulative resource discoveries and a geological estimate of undiscovered subsoil
resources. e disadvantage of this measure is that known resource endowments represent a
non-random sample of true resource endowments. Resource discovery depends on exploration
eﬀort, which is likely to be correlated with country characteristics such as property rights
institutions (Bohn and Deacon, 2000; Cust and Harding, 2017; Arezki, van der Ploeg, and
Toscani, 2017). Hence the diﬀerence between true endowment and known endowment is
a function of country characteristics that inﬂuence development. In contrast, sedimentary
basins cannot respond to country-level political or economic conditions.24 e next section
will discuss robustness checks comparing estimates using the basin instrument to estimates
using the oil endowment instrument from Tsui (2011).
In contrast to the empirical strategy presented here, researchers commonly use commodity
price shocks, either directly (Caselli and Tesei, 2016) or interacted with a time-invariant
measure of resource abundance (Bru¨ckner et al., 2012; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Andersen et al.,
2017; Carreri and Dube, 2017), as a source of exogenous variation in resource wealth. e
strategy appears very credible when applied to subnational data. However, in cross-country
studies, the approach raises two concerns. First, the commodity price may not be exogenous
to all countries. Producers with signiﬁcant market share, such as members of OPEC, may
adjust production to manipulate prices in response to changing global or domestic economic
conditions. is concern is alleviated by dropping large producers from the sample, but at the
expense of external validity. Second, the time-invariant measure of resource abundance, usually
calculated in an initial period or averaged over several periods, is endogenous in cross-country
regressions for reasons already mentioned. Identiﬁcation issues aside, the price-shock strategy
24In principle, there could be some relationship between the collection of data on sedimentary basins and
unobserved determinants of oil production or country outcomes. In subsection 5.5 we discuss why this is unlikely
to be a source of bias. Subsection 5.5 also considers the possibility that predetermined correlates of development
might be correlated with sedimentary basins.
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is suited for estimating the short-run eﬀects of natural resources, whereas this paper is focused
on long-run eﬀects.
4.2 Instrument Selection
No deﬁnitive ranking of sedimentary basin types by hydrocarbon potential exists in the
petroleum geology literature.25 erefore, we pursue a data-driven procedure for instrument
selection. In selecting a set of valid instrumental variables, the researcher generally faces a
trade-oﬀ between bias and eﬃciency. Starting from a baseline set of valid instruments, adding
additional valid instruments potentially improves asymptotic eﬃciency (Wooldridge, 2010,
pp. 229–230). However, the ﬁnite-sample bias of 2SLS generally grows with the number of
instruments used (Donald and Newey, 2001), posing a particularly severe problem when the
added instruments are weak (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995). Furthermore, the presence of
weak instruments can render inference based on the standard normal approximations invalid
(Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Yogo, 2003). In light of these concerns, we search for the
(possibly singleton) set of instruments that maximizes the ﬁrst-stage F statistic, rather than
including all possible instruments. In this way we prioritize minimizing bias and making
valid inferences over maximizing eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, for each of the two basin aggregation
methods described in Section 2, we estimate a ﬁrst-stage regression for every possible subset
of basins. For each regression, we calculate the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) robust rk Wald F
statistic for the excluded instruments.
e main results will be based on the set of instruments that maximizes this F statistic,
though we will also report results using the F statistic-maximizing instrument set for each
set size. It is important to note that the instrument selection procedure does not invalidate
second-stage inference. e reason is that model selection is performed at the service of
predicting oil production, not second-stage outcomes.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.7 in the online appendix provides general summary statistics. Average democracy
in 2008 (0.69) greatly exceeds average democracy in 1966 (0.44), reﬂecting a general trend
toward democratization. Table 1 summarizes variables separately according to whether the
country produced any oil from 1966–2008. In the sample period 96 countries had positive oil
production, and 76 had zero production. In 1966 average democracy in non-oil countries was
three percentage points higher than average democracy in oil countries. By 2008 this diﬀerence
had increased to seven percentage points, though neither diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
25Kingston, Dishroon, and Williams (1983) admit that “there is no magic formula which can separate sedimen-
tary basins into oil-and-gas-prone versus barren.”
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(p = 0.677, p = 0.182). Corruption levels and the number of coup aempts were similar in the
two groups, however oil countries had more internal conﬂict and purges (p = 0.068, p = 0.067).
While oil countries had greater total revenue as a proportion of GDP from 2000–2008 compared
to non-oil countries (p < 0.001), total non-resource tax revenue was lower in oil countries than
in non-oil countries (p = 0.179). Oil countries tended to be richer than non-oil countries, both
in 1966 (p < 0.001) and in 2008 (p < 0.001). Average executive constraints from 1950–1965
were slightly stronger in oil countries, although the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant
(p = 0.594). Unsurprisingly, all sedimentary basin measures are higher for oil countries, with
the exception of the relatively rare convergent ocean-ocean basins, though the diﬀerence in
average values is statistically insigniﬁcant. Average land area, coastline, mountainous area,
and good-soil area are statistically indistinguishable in the two groups, although oil countries
contain less tropical area on average (p = 0.029). It is important to note that the categories
mask considerable heterogeneity in production levels, as the distribution of oil production is
highly skewed.
5.2 First-Stage Results
Table 2 presents the ﬁrst-stage results for the eﬀect of the basin variables on oil production. To
conserve space, the table reports results for the three top-performing (in terms of ﬁrst-stage
F statistic) instrument sets for each approach to basin aggregation—global characteristics or
local characteristics. Tables A.8 and A.9 in the online appendix present the ﬁrst-stage results
for all 18 instrument sets considered. Each column in Table 2 reports the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) robust rk Wald F statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to
heteroskedasticity. In each table, column N reports the results using the instrument set of size
N that maximizes the ﬁrst-stage F statistic.
e ﬁrst group of instruments in Table 2 are aggregate categories based on global char-
acteristics: the general plate-tectonic environment and primary mechanism of subsidence.
e singleton instrument set that maximizes this F statistic is the basin type with convergent
continent-continent tectonics and mechanical subsidence, which achieves an F statistic of 25.3.
e aforementioned basin type, together with the basin type with convergent ocean-continent
tectonics and thermal subsidence, constitute the two-instrument set that maximizes the F
statistic, achieving an F statistic of 17.6. Inspection of Table A.8 reveals that, with one exception,
adding an additional instrument reduces the F statistic. When every instrument is included,
the F statistic equals 9.4.
e second group of instruments in Table 2 are aggregate categories based on the ﬁnal
element of the Fugro Tellus code, which indicates local characteristics of the depositional
environment. e singleton instrument set that maximizes the ﬁrst-stage F statistic is the
foreland basin type, which achieves an F statistic of 16.4. Foreland basins and intracratonic sag
basins constitute the two-instrument set that maximizes the ﬁrst-stage F statistic, achieving an
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F statistic of 17. From column 2 to column 10 in Table A.9, the F statistic declines monotonically
in the number of instruments included, equaling only 6.6 when every instrument is included.
Comparing the results across all instrument sets, the instrument set that maximizes the
F statistic is the singleton basin type with convergent continent-continent tectonics and
mechanical subsidence. e baseline second-stage results will be based on this instrument
set, though we report results using the other instrument sets in the online appendix. e
optimal instrument set’s F statistic of 25.3 indicates that strong-instrument asymptotic theory
applies. Nonetheless, to be conservative we also report 95-percent Anderson and Rubin (1949)
conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil. Unlike the usual Wald test, the Anderson-Rubin
test has correct size in the presence of weak instruments.
5.3 Second-Stage Results
Tables 3 and 4 present the main second-stage results. In each table, Panel A presents the OLS
estimates, and Panel B presents the IV estimates. Below the IV estimates in Panel B, we report
the p-value to a test of whether oil production is endogenous. e endogeneity test is the
Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil production is exogenous.
e test is valid under the assumption that Basin is exogenous.26
5.3.1 Political Resource Curse
Table 3 presents tests of the political resource curse hypothesis. e regressions presented
in the ﬁrst two columns provide strong evidence that oil wealth impedes democracy. e IV
estimates indicate that a one-percent increase in average annual oil production per capita
from 1966–2008 reduces the level of democracy in 2008 by 0.038. e same increase in oil
production reduces average democracy during 1966–2008 by 0.039. e eﬀects are statistically
signiﬁcant at the ﬁve- and one-percent levels, respectively, and appear to be large in political-
economic terms. An increase in oil production by one standard deviation (4.24 log points)
reduces the 2008 democracy score by 0.16, or half a standard deviation. is is roughly equal
to the diﬀerence between the scores of Colombia or Kenya (0.85) and the United States (1.0).
In both democracy speciﬁcations, the OLS estimates are smaller in absolute magnitude than
the IV estimates; in the second speciﬁcation we can statistically reject the exogeneity of oil
production (p = 0.063), although in the ﬁrst we cannot.
e results in column 3 suggest that oil wealth increases corruption, consistent with
conventional wisdom and previous empirical evidence (e.g., Bhaacharyya and Hodler, 2010).
An increase in oil production by one standard deviation increases corruption by 0.58 points,
or half a standard deviation. e OLS estimates are much smaller in absolute magnitude and
are statistically insigniﬁcant. e discrepancy between the OLS and IV results is consistent
26e test is essentially a heteroskedasticity-robust version of the usual Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the
diﬀerence between OLS and IV.
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with more corrupt countries aracting less oil exploration and production, perhaps due to a
poor business environment. In this speciﬁcation we can statistically reject the exogeneity of
oil production (p = 0.053).
e results in columns 4 through 6 provide lile evidence that oil wealth increases conﬂict—
contrary to conventional wisdom, though consistent with previous research (Cotet and Tsui,
2013). e OLS results suggest that oil wealth has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on internal
armed conﬂict, though the corresponding IV estimate is half the size of OLS and is statistically
insigniﬁcant. Both the OLS and IV regressions ﬁnd that the eﬀect of oil wealth on coup aempts
and purges is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Columns 7 and 8 examine the eﬀect of oil production on government revenue. e IV
estimate of the eﬀect of oil production on total government revenue is positive but statistically
insigniﬁcant. In contrast, the IV estimate of the eﬀect of oil production on tax revenue
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. A one-percent increase in oil production causes a
0.16-percent reduction in tax revenue as a share of GDP from 2000–2008. e eﬀect on tax
revenue is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. An increase in oil production by one standard
deviation causes a decline in tax revenue by 0.69 log points, or one standard deviations. is is
roughly the diﬀerence between Burundi (−2.01) and France (−1.32). e corresponding OLS
estimates are much smaller in absolute magnitude. e Hansen (1982) test decisively rejects
the exogeneity of oil production in the tax revenue speciﬁcation (p < 0.001) but not the total
revenue speciﬁcation.
5.3.2 Economic Resource Curse
Table 4 presents tests of the economic resource curse hypothesis. Column 1 presents results for
(log) GDP per capita, while columns 2 through 5 present results for disaggregated measures
of (log) GDP per capita. Both the OLS and IV estimates indicate that oil wealth raises GDP.
According to the IV estimate, a one-percent increase in average oil production per capita raises
GDP per capita in 2008 by 0.07 percent. e eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the ten-percent
level. Raising oil production by one standard deviation causes an increase in GDP by 0.31 log
points, or 0.25 standard deviations. is is roughly the diﬀerence between Norway (11.09) and
Ireland (10.78) or between Algeria (9.45) and Ecuador (9.14).
e results in column 1 could be consistent with oil wealth harming the non-resource
sectors of the economy, as long as the positive eﬀects on the resource sector outweigh the
negative eﬀects on the non-resource sectors. e OLS results in columns 2 through 5 indicate
that oil wealth actually raises non-resource GDP and manufacturing GDP. e IV estimates for
non-resource GDP are similar to the OLS estimates, though less precise. Together they suggest
that a one-percent increase on oil production raises non-resource GDP by 0.05 to 0.07 percent.
e OLS and IV estimates of the eﬀect of oil wealth on manufacturing signiﬁcantly diverge.
e OLS estimate indicates that a one-percent increase on oil production raises manufacturing
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GDP by almost 0.08 percent, and this estimate is signiﬁcant at the one-percent level. On the
other hand, the IV estimate is negative and statistically insigniﬁcant. We reject the exogeneity
of oil production in the manufacturing GDP equation (p = 0.079).
In four of the 13 speciﬁcations, the Hansen (1982) test rejects the exogeneity of oil produc-
tion at the 10-percent level. is outcome is unlikely to be due simply to chance or multiple
hypothesis testing. For example, if oil production were in fact exogenous in each of the 13
regressions, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 10-percent
level in four or more of the speciﬁcations is 0.034 (assuming the tests are independent).27
Furthermore, whenever the OLS and IV estimates diverge considerably, OLS understates
the negative eﬀects of oil relative to IV. us the results are consistent with the possibility
that countries with stronger political and ﬁscal institutions disproportionately select into oil
discovery and production.
5.4 Varying the Instrument Set
e results discussed so far are based on the optimal (singleton) instrument set whichmaximizes
the ﬁrst-stage F statistic. We now consider how the results change when the instrument set
changes. Figures A.4 and A.5 in the online appendix plot the second-stage results for the
political and economic outcomes, respectively, using instrument sets categorized according to
the general plate-tectonic environment and primary mechanism of subsidence. e results
based on N instruments use the instrument set of size N that achieves the highest ﬁrst-stage
F statistic. For each outcome, the gray, dashed line indicates the value of the corresponding
OLS estimate. As Table A.8 shows, each of the eight instrument sets is at least moderately
strong, however the ﬁrst (singleton) instrument set is signiﬁcantly stronger than the others,
with a ﬁrst-stage F statistic of 25.3. Because of this, along with the fact that the bias of 2SLS
generally increases with the number of instruments (Donald and Newey, 2001), we would
expect results based on the ﬁrst instrument set to have lower bias, but also lower precision,
compared to results based on the other instrument sets. Consistent with this prediction, the
estimated eﬀects of oil production on democracy, average democracy, corruption index, and tax
revenue are further from the OLS results and less precise when using one instrument—or even
two instruments—compared to estimates based on larger instrument sets. Adding additional,
weaker instruments pushes the 2SLS estimates toward the OLS estimate, which we expect to be
biased upwards for democracy and tax revenue and downwards for corruption. e estimates
of the eﬀect of oil production on internal conﬂict and purges show a somewhat diﬀerent
paern: estimates based on small instrument sets imply eﬀects roughly equal to zero, while
estimates based on larger instrument sets imply positive and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects.
e point estimates for coup aempts and total revenue do not change much as the instrument
27Under the stated assumptions, the number of rejections,W , has a binomial distribution with n = 13 and
p = 0.1. erefore, P(W ≥ 4) = 0.034.
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set varies. For every measure of GDP, the point estimates based on smaller instrument sets are
smaller than the point estimates based on larger instrument sets. is paern is especially
apparent for non-resource GDP and manufacturing GDP. Similar to the results for democracy,
corruption, and tax revenue, the GDP results are consistent with the fact that richer countries
with stronger institutions engage in more resource exploration and production.
Figures A.6 and A.7 in the online appendix plot the second-stage results for the political
and economic outcomes, respectively, using instrument sets categorized according to the local
properties of the depositional environment. Once again, results based on N instruments use
the instrument set of size N that achieves the highest ﬁrst-stage F statistic. e coeﬃcient
paerns are qualitatively similar to those in Figures A.4 and A.5 in the online appendix. e
main diﬀerence is that the estimates based on diﬀerent instrument sets diverge less from
each other, perhaps because the smaller instrument sets are weaker than in the case of the
tectonic-subsidence grouping. Another diﬀerence is that the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of
the estimated eﬀect of oil production is less sensitive to the instrument set—at least for the
political outcomes—than when instrument sets based on the tectonic-subsidence grouping
are used. In fact, nearly every instrument set implies that oil production has a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on democracy, average democracy, and tax revenue; a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on corruption, internal conﬂict, purges, and total revenue; and an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on
coup aempts. e preponderance of the evidence suggests that OLS understates the adverse
political eﬀects of oil production, though the OLS and 2SLS estimates oen are not statistically
diﬀerent from one another. In the GDP equations, by contrast, the OLS and 2SLS results are
similar for most instrument sets and do not suggest that OLS is systematically biased in one
direction or another.
5.5 Validity of the Instrument
5.5.1 Measurement
We now consider several potential objections to the validity of the Basin instrument. e ﬁrst
relates to measurement. Two of the three methods used to map sedimentary basins—core
sampling and seismic proﬁling—require the use of advanced technology and physical access to
the area under investigation. One might therefore worry that the precision or reliability of the
basin data is increasing in “good” institutions like property rights protections. In that case the
variance of the basin measurement error would be decreasing in the quality of institutions.
However, it does not follow that the measurement error is correlated with the quality of
institutions, so the above form of measurement error need not produce asymptotic bias.
Another version of the measurement argument supposes that basin area is systematically
underestimated in countries with poor institutions, invalidating the instrument. is argument
is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the paern of basin coverage by
region. Table A.6 in the online appendix summarizes the portion of sovereign area covered by
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sedimentary basins separately for seven regions deﬁned by common geographical location and
history. Basin coverage is actually higher on average in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (0.67)
and the Middle East and North Africa (0.86)—areas associated with relatively weak property-
rights protections—than in the extensively prospected areas of Northern, Central, Western,
and Southern Europe and Neo-Europes (0.57).28 is paern is visually conﬁrmed in Figure 1.
Second, even if basin area were underestimated in countries with poor institutions, the vast
majority of the conclusions drawn in this paper would hold up. is type of non-classical
measurement error would cause the IV estimates to understate the eﬀects of oil on democracy,
corruption, conﬂict, and ﬁscal capacity, so that the estimated coeﬃcients would oen provide
informative (absolute) lower bounds on the true eﬀect.29
5.5.2 Reverse-Engineering of the Basin Classiﬁcation
enext potential objection is that sedimentary basin classiﬁcation could be reverse-engineered:
the known presence or absence of hydrocarbons may inﬂuence how geologists categorize
a basin, based on their knowledge of other hydrocarbon-rich or hydrocarbon-poor basins.
erefore, some of the correlation between hydrocarbons and particular basin types may be
spurious rather than based on true geological features.
is issue is unlikely to invalid our results, for two reasons. First, reverse-engineering of
basin categories would bias the 2SLS estimates towards the OLS estimates. e intuition is
simple: in the most extreme case of reverse-engineering, a few basin types would have 100-
percent hydrocarbon success rates and would jointly predict oil production perfectly, causing
the 2SLS estimates to equal the OLS estimates. To the extent that the 2SLS and OLS estimates
diﬀer, the 2SLS estimates still provide useful bounds on the true eﬀects of oil production.
Second, as already discussed, Figures A.4, A.5, A.6, and A.7 in the online appendix show
that the results are broadly similar whether instruments are constructed based on global
characteristics of basins or local characteristics. It is unlikely that both the global and local
categorizations of basins could be reverse-engineered.
5.5.3 Predetermined Confounders
Another potential objection is that Basin could be correlated with omied determinants of
development, causing an asymptotic bias of unknown sign. To explore this possibility, Table 5
reports the results from regressing several predetermined variables on the basin instrument,
controls, and region eﬀects. e ﬁrst outcome is the urbanization rate in 1850, which is the
28e “Neo-Europes” are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
29Let Z , Z ∗, and X be the measured Basin, the true Basin, and Oil , respectively, aer neing out the control
variables using population projections. If the measurement error in Basin, e , is uncorrelated with the control
variables, then Z = Z ∗ + e (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 29). en the probability limit of βˆIV is β + Cov(ε, e)/Cov(X ,Z ).
Because Cov(X ,Z ) is positive, the sign of the bias depends on the sign of Cov(ε, e). For “good” outcome variables
like democracy, the example in the text implies that the bias is positive, whereas for “bad” outcome variables like
conﬂict, the bias is negative.
18
last year in the series provided by Chandler (1987). e next outcome is an indicator for have
a British legal origin, taken from William Easterly’s Global Development Network Growth
Database (Easterly, 2001). e third outcome is an indicator for having a legacy as a communist
country, taken from the list of communist countries in Kornai (1992). e next three outcomes
measure the percentage of the population that was Christian, Muslim, or Hindu in 1950.
ese data come from the World Religion Database (Johnson and Grim, 2017). e ﬁnal three
outcomes are measures of ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization produced by Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, andWacziarg (2003). Seven of the nine estimated coeﬃcients
on Basin are statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the instrument is uncorrelated with
historical determinants of long-run economic development, legal origin, communist legacy,
the presence of Christians or Hindus, or religious or linguistic fractionalization. e basin
instrument has a strong, positive correlation with the percentage of the population that was
Muslim in 1950. A large portion of this correlation is driven by the religious composition
and presence of basins in the Middle East and North Africa; adding a dummy variable for
this region causes the coeﬃcient on Basin to fall by half.30 e basin instrument also has a
positive correlation with ethnic fractionalization that is signiﬁcant at the ten-percent level. It
is therefore important to examine how the main results change when we control for these two
variables.
Table 6 reports the main results for the political outcomes using the optimal instrument
while controlling for the percentage of the population that was Muslim in 1950. e OLS
estimates of the eﬀect of oil production on the political outcomes generally move slightly closer
to zero while maintaining the same paern of signs and similar levels of statistical signiﬁcance:
oil production still has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on democracy, average democracy, and
tax revenue, while having a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on internal conﬂict and total revenue.
Controlling for the Muslim population causes the 2SLS estimates to become more imprecise,
due to a weakened ﬁrst stage. e 2SLS estimates for the eﬀect of oil production on democracy,
average democracy, and corruption all move towards zero while remaining greater than the
OLS point estimates in absolute value, once again suggesting that OLS may understate the
adverse eﬀects of oil wealth on institutions. ese three point estimates are now statistically
insigniﬁcant. Given that OLS likely provides an upper bound on the eﬀect of oil production on
democracy, we are still able to conclude that oil impedes democracy. Controlling for Muslim
population pushes the 2SLS estimate of the eﬀect of oil production on tax revenue slightly
closer to zero, however this estimate remains sizable and highly signiﬁcant.
Table 7 reports the main results for the economic outcomes using the optimal instrument
while controlling for the percentage of the population that was Muslim in 1950. Both the OLS
and 2SLS estimates are broadly similar to those in the baseline speciﬁcation, in terms of both
magnitude and signiﬁcance. Controlling for Muslim population leads to slightly larger positive
estimated eﬀects of oil production on GDP.
30Result not shown but available upon request.
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Overall, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the baseline 2SLS estimates may have slightly overstated
the adverse eﬀects of oil wealth on democracy and taxation while still providing strong evidence
that such adverse eﬀects exist. e results weaken the original claim that the OLS results for
average democracy and corruption were substantially biased, while conﬁrming the claim that
the OLS results for taxation were substantially biased. e robustness check conﬁrms the
baseline OLS and 2SLS estimates for the GDP regressions.
Are the above results limited to the optimal instrument, or do they apply to all instrument
sets? Figures A.8, A.9, A.10, and A.11 in the online appendix replicate the main results using
optimal instrument sets of diﬀerent sizes while controlling for the percentage of the population
that was Muslim in 1950. e paern of coeﬃcient estimates based on diﬀerent instrument
sets is very similar to the paern in the original ﬁgures. e two main diﬀerences are that
some point estimates move slightly closer to zero, and the conﬁdence intervals of all point
estimates grow.
Tables A.10 and A.11 in the online appendix report the main results using the optimal
instrument while controlling for ethnic fractionalization. e results are remarkably similar to
the baseline results, which is perhaps unsurprising given that the partial correlation between
Basin and ethnic fractionalization is weak. Figures A.12, A.13, A.14, and A.15 in the online
appendix conﬁrm that the results using diﬀerent instrument sets hardly change when we
control for ethnic fractionalization.
5.5.4 Placebo Tests
While it is reassuring that our conclusions do not change signiﬁcantly when accounting for
the inﬂuence of potential confounders described above, there may be other determinants of
political and economic development that are correlated with the basin instrument. We address
this possibility with two placebo tests. If Basin impacts development only through the channel
of oil wealth, then it should have no impact on economic and political outcomes in years when
oil was not a commercially valuable commodity or when world oil production was minimal.
Before 1859 the value of oil was modest. e year 1859 saw both the ﬁrst modern oil well (by
Edwin Drake) and the ﬁrst commercially successful internal-combustion engine (by E´tienne
Lenoir) (Britannica, 2015). Prior to 1920 no country produced a signiﬁcant amount of oil,
deﬁned as $100 per capita (in constant 2007 USD) (Andersen and Ross, 2014). In 1940 there
were three signiﬁcant oil producers, and by 1950 there were 10. For context, 56 countries were
signiﬁcant oil producers in 2008 (Ross, 2013).
Figure 2 plots estimates of the reduced-form eﬀect of Basin on political and economic
development in diﬀerent years, controlling for geography and climate. Panel (a) presents the
eﬀect of Basin on the polity index. To examine the changing inﬂuence of the basin instrument
over time, we ﬁx the sample of countries. e four graphs are based on ﬁxed country samples
starting in 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930. All four graphs tell the same story: prior to 1940, the
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eﬀect of Basin on democracy was statistically indistinguishable from zero. Starting in 1940,
Basin had a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, and this negative eﬀect persisted to
2008.
Panel (b) is similar, presenting four graphs of the reduced-form eﬀect of Basin on log
population density over time. We focus on population density, because GDP data prior to 1950
are available only for a small number of countries. Prior to 1950, the availability of population
data from Maddison (2013) varies considerably from year to year. We choose to measure log
population density in the years 1820, 1870, and 1913, because these are the only years prior to
1950 for which population data are available for more than 65 countries. e graphs suggest
that Basin had no inﬂuence on log population density prior to 1970; the eﬀect of Basin on log
population density becomes positive and statistically signiﬁcant starting in 1990.
Together, the results in Figure 2 suggest that Basin did not inﬂuence political and economic
development in periods in which the value of oil production was insigniﬁcant. ese results
strengthen the claim that the baseline results are not simply driven by omied variables that
are correlated with both Basin and long-run development.
5.5.5 Predetermined Borders
e validity of the basin instrument rests on the assumption that national borders were drawn
without consideration for the locations of sedimentary basins. e most plausible violation of
this assumption would occur in geographic regions where modern borders were established
aer the discovery of oil. If oil-ﬁeld acquisition (hence basin acquisition) via border changes
were systematically related to potential outcomes—e.g., if more economically or militarily
powerful countries acquired more oil ﬁelds through territorial conquest or delimiting colonial
dependencies—then the IV estimator would be inconsistent for the treatment eﬀect of interest.
To address this concern we replicate the main analysis on the subsample that excludes any
country whose land borders could have plausibly been inﬂuenced by the location of oil ﬁelds.31
We ﬁrst record the year of the earliest known oil discovery for each country, according to
ieme, Lujala, and Rød (2007); Lujala, Rød, and ieme (2007). We then record the year of the
earliest establishment of modern borders, using the information in Strang (1991), Britannica
(2015), and CIA (2015). It is important to note that the modern borders of most former colonies
and former satellite states were drawn decades before independence. Finally, we record the
dates of all changes to homeland territory (as opposed to dependency territory) since 1816,
according to Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Goertz (1998). Using data on country contiguity from
Correlates of War Project (2007) (described in Stinne, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman (2002))
to identify neighboring countries, we implement the following procedure:
1. Exclude country A if country A ﬁrst discovered oil before its modern borders were set.
31We focus this robustness check on land borders for tractability, as maritime borders are oen ambiguous or
disputed.
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2. Exclude country A if country A’s neighbor, country B, ﬁrst discovered oil before country
A’s modern borders were set, and country B’s modern borders were not set prior to the
discovery.
3. To minimize unnecessary exclusions, include countries that were to be excluded accord-
ing to Rule 1 or Rule 2 if either (a) there are no known onshore oil ﬁelds within 200
kilometers of the border in question, or (b) there are no land basins within 200 kilometers
of the border in question.
4. Include countries with borders set prior to 1859, even if they qualify for exclusion
according to Rule 1 or Rule 2.32
e procedure results in the exclusion of 61 countries from the baseline sample of 157
countries. Tables 8 and 9 report regression results based on the sample of countries with
borders that were not plausibly inﬂuenced by the location of oil ﬁelds or basins. e results
are remarkably similar to the results from the full sample, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
e broad similarity of the results to the main results suggests that countries with borders
drawn aer the discovery of oil are not systematically diﬀerent than countries with borders
drawn before the discovery of oil.
5.6 Comparison to Endowment Instrument
e closest predecessor to the identiﬁcation strategy in this paper is Tsui (2011), who uses oil
endowment as an instrument for oil discovery. To facilitate comparison between Tsui (2011)
and the current paper, we normalize the oil endowment variable in the same manner that
we normalize the basin variables: Endowment is the (log of) total oil endowment in millions
of barrels divided by 1960 population.33 As mentioned in the introduction, there are a priori
reasons to worry that known oil endowment is endogenous. We ﬁnd suggestive statistical
evidence that this is indeed the case. Tables A.12 and A.13 in the online appendix compare the
OLS results, 2SLS results based on Endowment, and 2SLS results based on Basin. e ﬁrst-stage
F statistic on Endowment is extremely large—410 in the full sample—and IV estimates using
Endowment are almost always closer than IV estimates using Basin to the OLS estimates. In
addition, the Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test rejects the exogeneity of Endowment in the
average democracy, corruption, tax revenue, and manufacturing GDP speciﬁcations, though
it fails to reject exogeneity in the other speciﬁcations.34 Nonetheless, the Endowment and
Basin instruments produce the same qualitative conclusions, providing support for the political
resource curse hypothesis and rejecting the economic resource curse hypothesis.
32Before 1859 petroleum was arguably not a very valuable commodity and thus would not have inﬂuenced
border formation. e year 1859 saw both the ﬁrst modern oil well (by Edwin Drake) and the ﬁrst commercially
successful internal-combustion engine (by E´tienne Lenoir) (Britannica, 2015).
33e data on oil endowment is shared online by Cotet and Tsui (2013).
34is overidentiﬁcation test evaluates the exogeneity of Endowment under the assumption that Basin is
exogenous.
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5.7 Discussion
e estimated negative eﬀects of oil production on democracy and tax revenue indicate that
oil wealth has a tendency to degrade—or retard the development of—democratic institutions
and ﬁscal capacity over the long run. Oil wealth increases the value of holding political
power, which in theory could make a coups d’e´tat more aractive in the eyes of potential
usurpers. However, the resource revenue also strengthens the government’s hand, potentially
funding investment in defense.35 e results of this section suggest that oil wealth increases
government repression in the form of purges.36 However, in equilibrium oil wealth does not
lead to more coup aempts. is result is consistent with the model of Tsui (2010), which
predicts that the number of political insurgents will be independent of the size of resource
wealth.37 e reason is that an increase in resource wealth induces the ruler to invest in
political entry barriers which deter potential insurgents.
e fact that OLS underestimates the pernicious eﬀects of oil on democracy and tax revenue
suggests that countries with beer political institutions and greater state capacity have a greater
propensity to select into oil production.38 e results are consistent with recent evidence
that the drilling decisions of international oil companies are highly sensitive to the quality of
national institutions (Cust and Harding, 2017).
6 Heterogeneous Eﬀects by Executive Constraints
6.1 eory
Several political economy models predict that the political and economic eﬀects of natural re-
source wealth will depend on the quality of institutions. In some models institutions determine
the extent to which incumbents can spend resources to increase their likelihood of staying
in power. e degree to which resource booms promote autocracy or resource misallocation
within the economy thus depends on institutions (Robinson et al., 2006; Caselli and Tesei,
2016). In a similar vein, democratic institutions determine the degree to which popular support
(or lack thereof) aﬀects the incumbent’s chances of staying in power. While resource booms
increase the scope of corruption, incumbents are less likely to embezzle state funds when
democratic institutions are strong (Bhaacharyya and Hodler, 2010). In addition, resource
rents are more likely to promote repression and civil war when political checks and balances
are weak (Besley and Persson, 2009b, 2011). Finally, resource abundance can reduce economic
35Cotet and Tsui (2013) ﬁnd that oil discoveries increase military spending in nondemocratic countries.
36Note that we ﬁnd a positive, signiﬁcant eﬀect of oil production on purges using many instrument sets of size
greater than one. e evidence on internal armed conﬂict is inconclusive.
37is result depends on the counterinsurgent technology having constant returns to scale.
38Prospecting intensity probably accounts for most of the diﬀerential selection into oil production. While
known subsoil assets in the OECD countries are valued at around US$265,000 per square kilometer, in sub-Saharan
Africa known subsoil assets are valued at only US$45,000 per square kilometer (Collier and Laroche, 2015).
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growth when institutions favor rent-seeking over productive activities (Mehlum et al., 2006).39
In the online appendix we present a theoretical model that predicts that institutions will
determine the eﬀect of resource revenue on the incumbent’s joint decision over the political
regime and tax policy. An autocrat faces the threat of a popular uprising and must decide
whether to allow a transition to democracy or suppress the movement using bribes. Under
democracy the median voter, who is poor, chooses a positive tax rate. When the autocrat
chooses to suppress democracy, his optimal strategy involves bribing the rich citizens and
seing taxes equal to zero. Both the autocrat’s ability and willingness to suppress democ-
racy increase in the amount of resource rents accruing to the autocrat. However, executive
constraints create transaction costs associated with stealing resource rents from government
coﬀers and making bribes. As a result, a resource boom increases the likelihood that autocracy
and low taxation persist if and only if executive constraints are suﬃciently weak. See the
online appendix for details.
6.2 Evidence
To test the implications of the theoretical models described above, we estimate the eﬀects
of oil production, allowing for heterogeneity in the response according to the strength of
executive constraints. We construct a measure of initial executive constraints by averaging
each country’s XCONST score (Polity IV) from 1950–1965.40 e variable XCONST is measured
on a scale of one to seven, with one indicating “unlimited authority,” three indicating “slight to
moderate limitation on executive authority,” ﬁve indicating “substantial limitations on executive
authority,” and seven indicating “executive parity or subordination.” Numbers two, four, and
six denote intermediate categories. We construct an indicator variable, weak constraints, which
equals one for countries that averaged a score of three or lower from 1950–1965. In our sample
the median score for average XCONST over this period is three.
We split the sample into two subsamples—countries with relatively strong executive con-
straints and those with relatively weak constraints—and estimate the structural equation
separately for each subsample. We then compare the IV estimates obtained in each subsample.
While we have data on democracy in 2008 for 157 countries, we observe weak constraints for
only 116 countries. is is because countries that gained independence aer 1965 have missing
values for XCONST for all years from 1950–1965.
Tables A.14 and A.15 in the online appendix present the results of the heterogeneity analysis.
e validity of the exercise relies on the assumption that weak constraints is uncorrelated
with unobserved determinants of development. In the online appendix we show that weak
constraints is, for the most part, uncorrelated with the diﬀerent sedimentary basin measures.
39See Tsui (2010) for a model that combines the economic and political dimensions of the resource curse while
modeling institutions as the deadweight costs associated with rent appropriate and political entry deterrence.
40Naturally, the sample is restricted to countries with at least one observation of XCONST from 1950–1965.
We use a 16-year average to reduce noise and maximize sample size.
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Nonetheless, exogeneity is a strong assumption, and the results in this section should be
interpreted with caution. e optimal basin instrument in the full-sample analysis leads to
excessively small ﬁrst-stage F statistics in the subsample analysis. We therefore report results
based on the instrument set {Foreland, Intracratonic Sag}, which produces modestly sized
ﬁrst-stage F statistics in the subsamples. We checked the results using the seven strongest
instrument sets according to Tables A.8 and A.9, and the paern of second-stage coeﬃcients is
very similar using diﬀerent instrument sets.
6.2.1 Political Resource Curse
Table A.14 in the online appendix presents the results of the heterogeneity analysis for the
political outcomes. As shown in Panel A, in the sample of strong-constraints countries, oil
production has a statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on each political variable, with the exception
of total revenue. In contrast, Panel B shows that, in the sample of weak-constraints countries,
oil production has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on six of the eight outcomes, reducing
democracy in 2008, average democracy from 1966–2008, and tax revenue; and increasing
internal conﬂict, purges, and total revenue. e eﬀects of oil production on corruption and
coup aempts are statistically insigniﬁcant in the sample of weak-constraints countries.
A one-percent increase in oil production reduces the level of democracy in 2008 by 0.044.
e eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-percent level. In the weak-constraints sample, an increase
in oil production of one standard deviation (4.24 log points) reduces 2008 democracy by 0.19,
or 0.59 standard deviations.41 is is roughly equal to the diﬀerence between the scores of
Algeria (0.6) and Malawi (0.8).42 e negative eﬀect of oil on democracy in 2008 is smaller in
magnitude (−0.027) and statistically insigniﬁcant in the strong-constraints sample.
Oil production also has a large eﬀect on tax revenue in the sample of weak-constraints
countries. A one-percent increase in oil production reduces the tax-revenue-to-GDP ratio by
0.108 percent in the sample of countries with weak constraints. e estimate is signiﬁcant at
the ﬁve-percent level. Among countries with weak constraints, increasing oil production by
one standard deviation (4.24 log points) reduces the tax revenue share of GDP by 0.46, or 0.67
standard deviations, which is roughly equal to the diﬀerence in tax revenue between Nicaragua
(−1.83) and Mexico (−2.33).43 e negative eﬀect of oil on tax revenue is smaller in magnitude
(−0.012) and statistically insigniﬁcant in the strong-constraints sample.
Overall, the results suggest that the adverse political consequences of oil wealth are
concentrated in the sample of countries with weak initial constraints on the executive. While
the point estimates in the two subsamples oen diﬀer substantially, Panel C shows that we are
unable to reject the hypothesis that the point estimates are equation in any of the equations,
41e standard deviation of 2008 democracy in the weak-constraints sample is 0.31.
42While bothAlgeria andMalawi hadweak executive constraints from 1950–1965, Algeria produced a signiﬁcant
amount of oil from 1966–2008, and Malawi produced no oil.
43Both Nicaragua and Mexico had weak executive constraints from 1950–1965. From 1966–2008 oil production
was substantial in Mexico and nil in Nicaragua.
perhaps owing to the small sample sizes.
6.2.2 Economic Resource Curse
Table A.15 in the online appendix presents the results of the heterogeneity analysis for the
economic outcomes. As shown in Panel A, in the sample of strong-constraints countries,
oil production has a positive eﬀect on each economic variable, though each coeﬃcient is
statistically insigniﬁcant. e point estimates for the sample of weak-constraints countries,
reported in Panel B, are slightly larger than those in Panel A, and they are all signiﬁcant
at least at the ten-percent level. In the weak-constraints sample, a one-percent increase in
oil production raises GDP per capita by 0.15 percent, and the eﬀect is almost identical for
manufacturing GDP—contrary to the Dutch Disease hypothesis.
6.2.3 Weak Constraints
e heterogeneity analysis would be invalid if, for example, pre-1966 oil production aﬀected
both weak constraints and post-1966 democracy and tax revenue. However, the Basin measures
have virtually no statistical association with weak constraints, as shown in the online appendix.
e only basin types that have a statistically signiﬁcant association with weak constraints
are convergent ocean-ocean basins, convergent wrench basins, and fore-arc basins. In all
three cases, the association with weak constraints is negative, which contradicts the claim that
pre-1966 oil production adversely aﬀected pre-1966 institutions.
6.3 Discussion
We ﬁnd evidence that the long-run eﬀects of oil wealth on development may be heterogeneous.
In particular, the adverse eﬀects of oil on democracy and ﬁscal capacity are concentrated in
the subsample of countries that had weak executive constraints from 1950–1965. is result
is consistent with other recent ﬁndings. Tsui (2011) ﬁnds that the discovery of oil impeded
democratization only in countries that were non-democratic at the time of discovery. Similarly,
Caselli and Tesei (2016) show that resource windfalls cause autocratic countries to become
even more autocratic, whereas they have no eﬀect on the regime in democratic countries or in
deeply entrenched autocracies. Finally, Andersen and Aslaksen (2013) show that oil wealth
positively aﬀects political survival (measured as the leader’s duration in oﬃce) in intermediate
and autocratic regimes, but not in democracies. In contrast to the results of Bhaacharyya and
Hodler (2010), we do not observe heterogeneous eﬀects of oil on corruption. Neither does the
eﬀect of oil on conﬂict seem to diﬀer according to institutional quality. e ﬁnding that oil has
a larger positive eﬀect on GDP in weak-constraints countries is consistent with other evidence
that less developed countries have the largest GDP gains from oil production (Alexeev and
Conrad, 2009; Smith, 2015).
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In order to identify a heterogeneous eﬀect of oil, the dimension of heterogeneity (e.g.,
political institutions) must be uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of future political
outcomes and oil wealth. Of course, this assumption is unlikely to hold. However, unlike
the studies mentioned above, we condition on initial rather than contemporaneous political
institutions to (partially) alleviate concerns about the simultaneity of political institutions and
resource production.
e heterogeneity results are interesting in light of the recent literature on the determinants
of ﬁscal capacity. Previous empirical studies ﬁnd that resourcewealth tends to negatively impact
tax revenue (Ca´rdenas et al., 2011; Jensen, 2011; Crivelli and Gupta, 2014). However, these
studies do not test for heterogeneous eﬀects. e ﬁscal capacity model of Besley and Persson
(2009a, 2010); Besley and Persson (2011) predicts that a “common-interest” state emerges
when institutions are “cohesive” enough. In their model institutional cohesion depends on the
ability of the group in power to redistribute resources away from the group not in power. In
a common-interest state, politicians invest in ﬁscal capacity, because they know that future
capacity to tax will be used to raise funds for common-interest public goods rather than for
redistributing income away from the group not in power. Because the marginal utility from
public goods is assumed to be declining, a relaxation of the government’s budget constraint
due to a resource windfall causes the group in power to invest less in ﬁscal capacity. When
institutions are not cohesive, no group invests in ﬁscal capacity, regardless of the level of
resource revenue. erefore, the model predicts that resource rents lower future tax revenue
only in countries with cohesive institutions. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect of oil
production on future tax revenue is strongest in countries that lack cohesive institutions. Our
results are not wholly inconsistent with the ﬁscal capacity model, however they do underscore
the importance of low taxation as a means of political survival.
7 Conclusion
Using a new instrumental variables approach, we ﬁnd that oil wealth impedes democracy,
increases corruption, reduces taxation, and raises GDP without signiﬁcantly harming the
non-resource sectors of the economy. We ﬁnd no evidence that oil wealth increases internal
armed conﬂict, coup aempts, or political purges. In several speciﬁcations OLS substantially
underestimates the detrimental eﬀects of oil, suggesting that countries with beer institutions
disproportionately select into oil discovery and production. Controlling for the percentage of
the population that was Muslim in 1950 aenuates the estimates for democracy and corruption,
though oil production still appears to adversely aﬀect these outcomes. For outcomes such as
democracy and ﬁscal capacity, the initial strength of executive constraints appears to determine
whether subsequent oil production is a curse or a blessing. However, initial institutions seem
to maer less for how oil aﬀects corruption, conﬂict, and purges. Despite suﬀering a political
resource curse, countries with weak initial institutions saw the greatest economic gains from
27
oil wealth, at least in aggregate terms.
is paper’s identiﬁcation strategy is useful to researchers studying the long-run impact
of oil wealth on any outcome in cross-country data. e strategy can also be applied to
subnational analyses—granted that the geographic units of analysis are large—because the
spatial distribution of sedimentary basins generates exogenous within-country variation in
oil endowment. Furthermore, the general idea of the strategy—that geophysical processes
provide useful identifying variation in resource wealth—may prove useful for studying the
eﬀects of mineral resources in other contexts. Recent examples in this vein include Fernihough
and O’Rourke (2014) and Bartik et al. (2017), who exploit geological information to study the
economic eﬀects of coal and fracking, respectively.
One limitation of this study is that it does not cleanly identify how the potential economic
beneﬁt of resource extraction varies with institutional quality. e fact that countries starting
with weak institutions experienced the largest economic gains from oil wealth probably owes
more to the initial poverty of these countries than to the pure mediating eﬀect of institutions.
Future work should examine this mediating eﬀect by using variation in institutions that is
orthogonal to both resource wealth and economic conditions. Such an analysis may be possible
at the country level using “exogenous” democratic transitions (Pozuelo, Slipowitz, and Vuletin,
2016) or at the subnational level in countries that experienced regional variation in the timing
of democratic reforms, such as Indonesia (Skouﬁas, Narayan, Dasgupta, and Kaiser, 2014).
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8 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Oil Presence
Oil Countries Non-Oil Countries Diﬀerence p-value
Democracy, 2008 0.66 0.73 −0.07 0.182
Democracy, 1966 0.43 0.46 −0.03 0.677
Avg. democracy, 1966–2008 0.52 0.54 −0.02 0.683
Corruption, 2008 3.38 3.52 −0.14 0.508
Internal conﬂicts per year, 1966–2008 0.27 0.13 0.13∗ 0.068
Coup aempts per year, 1966–2008 0.05 0.07 −0.01 0.330
Purges per year, 1966–2008 0.08 0.04 0.04∗ 0.067
Total revenue, 2000–2008 (log avg.) −1.41 −1.68 0.27∗∗∗ 0.000
Tax revenue, 2000–2008 (log avg.) −2.04 −1.89 −0.14 0.179
GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.46 8.58 0.88∗∗∗ 0.000
GDP, 1966 (log p.c.) 8.01 7.24 0.77∗∗∗ 0.000
Non-Oil GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.34 9.11 0.23 0.300
Non-Oil/Gas GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.36 9.11 0.25 0.256
Non-Resource GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.27 8.51 0.76∗∗∗ 0.000
Manufacturing GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 7.39 6.51 0.88∗∗∗ 0.000
Executive constraints, 1950–1965 0.48 0.45 0.04 0.594
Oil production, 1966–2008 (log avg. p.c.) −1.60 −9.03 7.42∗∗∗ 0.000
Oil endowment (log p.c.) −8.78 −11.93 3.15∗∗∗ 0.000
Convergent C-C mechanical area (log p.c.) −7.37 −9.61 2.23∗∗∗ 0.000
Convergent O-C thermal area (log p.c.) −8.74 −8.99 0.25∗∗ 0.021
Convergent O-C mechanical area (log p.c.) −8.81 −10.64 1.83∗∗∗ 0.001
Convergent O-O area (log p.c.) −9.92 −9.63 −0.29 0.428
Divergent thermal area (log p.c.) −5.90 −7.29 1.38∗ 0.066
Wrench mechanical area (log p.c.) −12.82 −13.80 0.97∗ 0.084
Divergent mechanical area (log p.c.) −10.43 −10.89 0.46 0.264
Convergent C-C thermo-mechanical area (log p.c.) −8.40 −8.68 0.28∗∗ 0.047
Foreland area (log p.c.) −5.96 −8.47 2.51∗∗∗ 0.000
Intracratonic sag area (log p.c.) −10.05 −12.21 2.16∗∗∗ 0.007
Passive margin area (log p.c.) −8.26 −9.45 1.19 0.136
Convergent sag area (log p.c.) −14.39 −15.98 1.59∗∗∗ 0.001
Post-ri sag area (log p.c.) −9.57 −10.97 1.40∗∗ 0.010
Wrench area (log p.c.) −12.82 −13.80 0.97∗ 0.084
Extensional area (log p.c.) −9.82 −9.99 0.17 0.589
Convergent wrench area (log p.c.) −11.47 −11.93 0.46 0.355
Fore-arc area (log p.c.) −10.03 −10.75 0.72 0.141
Ri area (log p.c.) −10.43 −10.89 0.46 0.264
Land area (log p.c.) −3.09 −3.41 0.32 0.185
Coastline (log p.c.) −9.22 −9.51 0.29 0.528
Mountainous area (log p.c.) −6.23 −6.92 0.69 0.132
Tropical area (log p.c.) −6.77 −5.49 −1.28∗∗ 0.030
Good soil area (log p.c.) −6.70 −6.91 0.21 0.599
Observations 96 76
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. is table deﬁnes oil countries as those
countries that had positive oil production at any time from 1966–2008. Averages are reported in the ﬁrst two
columns. e third column reports the diﬀerence of the averages, and the fourth column reports the p-value
corresponding to the two-sided test of equality of the averages. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
36
Table 2: First-Stage Estimates for Optimal Sets of Basin Instruments
Log Avg. Oil Production per capita, 1966–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Global Characteristics:
Convergent C-C mechanical 0.599∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.124)
Convergent O-C thermal 0.589∗∗∗
(0.175)
Convergent O-C mechanical 0.359∗∗∗
(0.084)
Convergent O-O −0.362∗∗
(0.139)
Local Characteristics:
Foreland 0.576∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.143) (0.139)
Intracratonic sag 0.213∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.068)
Passive margin 0.091
(0.076)
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157
R2 0.318 0.327 0.394 0.315 0.357 0.364
F statistic 25.3 17.6 18.9 16.4 17.0 14.4
Notes. See Tables A.3 and A.4 in the online appendix for basin variable deﬁnitions. See Table A.1 in the online
appendix for other variable deﬁnitions. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests
for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land
area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Testing for a Political Resource Curse
Democracy, Avg. Democracy, Corruption, Internal Conﬂict, Coup Aempts, Purges, Total Revenue, Tax Revenue,
2008 1966–2008 2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 2000–2008 2000–2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production −0.019∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.032 0.012∗∗ 0.001 0.003 0.032∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
R2 0.441 0.536 0.334 0.204 0.203 0.093 0.463 0.471
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production −0.038∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.007 0.002 −0.001 0.021 −0.163∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.060) (0.018) (0.003) (0.005) (0.016) (0.039)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
F statistic 25.3 26.7 23.2 31.4 26.7 31.4 29.3 27.3
A-R 95% CI [−0.081,−0.008] [−0.077,−0.014] [0.027, 0.280] [−0.030, 0.045] [−0.004, 0.009] [−0.011, 0.010] [−0.015, 0.053] [−0.268,−0.100]
Oil exog. 0.209 0.063 0.053 0.780 0.578 0.445 0.446 0.000
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls
(tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95% conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the
null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the presence of weak instruments.
e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Testing for an Economic Resource Course
GDP, Non-Oil Non-Oil/Gas Non-Resource Manufacturing
2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production 0.092∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
R2 0.661 0.623 0.608 0.657 0.599
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production 0.074∗ 0.045 0.039 0.054 −0.037
(0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.075)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
F statistic 29.3 20.4 20.1 29.3 14.3
A-R 95% CI [−0.010, 0.157] [−0.047, 0.139] [−0.055, 0.132] [−0.033, 0.137] [−0.246, 0.097]
Oil exog. 0.632 0.963 0.967 0.646 0.079
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls
(land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed
eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95%
conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the
presence of weak instruments. e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen
(1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Partial Correlation between Basin and Predetermined Variables
Urbanization, British Legal Communist Percentage Percentage Percentage Fractionalization:
1850 Origin Legacy Christian, 1950 Muslim, 1950 Hindu, 1950 Ethnic Religious Linguistic
Convergent C-C mechanical −0.050 0.003 −0.014 −0.357 5.759∗∗∗ 0.015 0.015∗ 0.002 0.008
(0.277) (0.015) (0.012) (0.597) (0.865) (0.214) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 84 163 172 172 172 172 171 172 165
R2 0.449 0.086 0.060 0.800 0.495 0.078 0.407 0.093 0.402
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls
(tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Testing for a Political Resource Curse (Controlling for Percentage Muslim in 1950)
Democracy, Avg. Democracy, Corruption, Internal Conﬂict, Coup Aempts, Purges, Total Revenue, Tax Revenue,
2008 1966–2008 2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 2000–2008 2000–2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production −0.014∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ 0.018 0.012∗ −0.000 0.003 0.034∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
R2 0.477 0.567 0.359 0.204 0.231 0.093 0.464 0.530
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production −0.016 −0.025 0.093 0.003 −0.003 −0.001 0.023 −0.138∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.077) (0.022) (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) (0.044)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
F statistic 12.4 15.3 10.6 18.9 15.3 18.9 16.3 14.8
A-R 95% CI [−0.062, 0.025] [−0.067, 0.004] [−0.073, 0.298] [−0.047, 0.048] [−0.014, 0.006] [−0.015, 0.012] [−0.025, 0.064] [−0.274,−0.068]
Oil exog. 0.893 0.339 0.318 0.675 0.470 0.488 0.585 0.006
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls
(tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95% conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the
null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the presence of weak instruments.
e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Testing for an Economic Resource Course (Controlling for Percentage Muslim in 1950)
GDP, Non-Oil Non-Oil/Gas Non-Resource Manufacturing
2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production 0.099∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
R2 0.668 0.628 0.611 0.665 0.616
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production 0.112∗∗ 0.087 0.074 0.096∗ 0.011
(0.051) (0.060) (0.061) (0.052) (0.097)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
F statistic 17.1 11.7 10.8 17.1 6.8
A-R 95% CI [0.005, 0.228] [−0.033, 0.245] [−0.058, 0.234] [−0.012, 0.216] [−0.344, 0.224]
Oil exog. 0.793 0.499 0.631 0.735 0.401
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls
(land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed
eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95%
conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the
presence of weak instruments. e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen
(1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Testing for a Political Resource Curse: Subsample with Predetermined Borders
Democracy, Avg. Democracy, Corruption, Internal Conﬂict, Coup Aempts, Purges, Total Revenue, Tax Revenue,
2008 1966–2008 2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 2000–2008 2000–2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production −0.017∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.044 0.014∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.020∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.030) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014)
Observations 96 97 80 108 97 108 104 105
R2 0.395 0.580 0.376 0.219 0.201 0.119 0.441 0.467
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production −0.035∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.009 0.001 −0.000 0.006 −0.138∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.068) (0.012) (0.003) (0.008) (0.019) (0.047)
Observations 96 97 80 108 97 108 104 105
F statistic 21.7 21.7 20.4 27.8 21.7 27.8 30.3 25.4
A-R 95% CI [−0.067,−0.008] [−0.071,−0.021] [0.018, 0.311] [−0.016, 0.035] [−0.006, 0.009] [−0.017, 0.017] [−0.035, 0.044] [−0.260,−0.058]
Oil exog. 0.157 0.038 0.086 0.637 0.698 0.809 0.387 0.033
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls
(tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95% conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the
null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the presence of weak instruments.
e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Testing for an Economic Resource Course: Subsample with Predetermined Borders
GDP, Non-Oil Non-Oil/Gas Non-Resource Manufacturing
2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production 0.081∗∗∗ 0.036 0.036 0.062∗∗∗ 0.049
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.031)
Observations 105 73 70 105 89
R2 0.686 0.647 0.632 0.678 0.596
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production 0.112∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.096 0.107∗∗ 0.006
(0.050) (0.059) (0.060) (0.051) (0.084)
Observations 105 73 70 105 89
F statistic 30.4 19.4 18.5 30.4 13.9
A-R 95% CI [0.020, 0.229] [−0.005, 0.254] [−0.008, 0.252] [0.013, 0.227] [−0.181, 0.196]
Oil exog. 0.484 0.225 0.239 0.331 0.577
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls
(land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed
eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95%
conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the
presence of weak instruments. e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen
(1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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9 Figures
Figure 1: Sedimentary Basins and Giant Oil and Gas Fields
Legend
Rift
Intracratonic Sag
Post-rift Sag
Post-rift Sag with Inversion
Passive Margin
Passive Margin with Inversion
Peripheral Foreland (Continent - Continent)
Peripheral Foreland with Piggyback (Continent - Continent)
Syn-orogenic Extensional (Continent - Continent)
Intramontane Wrench (Continent - Continent)
Late to Post-orogenic Extension (Continent - Continent)
Trapped Oceanic Crustal Sag (Continent - Continent)
Fore-arc (Ocean - Continent)
Retro-arc Foreland (Ocean - Continent)
Retro-arc Extensional (Ocean - Continent)
Retro-arc Post-extensional Sag (Ocean - Continent)
Arc-related Wrench (Ocean - Continent)
Fore-arc (Ocean - Ocean)
Retro-arc Foreland (Ocean - Ocean)
Retro-arc Extensional (Ocean - Ocean)
Arc-related Wrench (Ocean - Ocean)
Retro-arc Post-extensional Sag (Ocean - Ocean)
Intracratonic Wrench
Wrench (Ocean - Continent)
Notes. Colored areas represent sedimentary basins, and yellow dots represent giant oil and gas ﬁelds. e GIS data on sedimentary basins come from Fugro Robertson, Ltd.
(2013), and the GIS data on giant oil and gas ﬁelds come from Horn (2004).
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Figure 2: Placebo Tests
(a) Eﬀect of Basin on Democracy by Year
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(b) Eﬀect of Basin on Log Population Density by Year
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 95-percent conﬁdence intervals for the reduced-form eﬀect of the
optimally chosen Basin variable over time, controlling for geography and climate. In each graph, the sample of
countries is ﬁxed. e outcome variable in Panel (a) is democracy, and the outcome variable in Panel (b) is log
population density.
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A Appendix (For Online Publication)
A.1 Heterogeneous Eﬀects: eory
A.1.1 e Environment
Suppose the economy is populated by an autocrat and a continuum of citizens. ere are two
time periods, indexed by t ∈ {1, 2}. In period one the state of the world is autocracy, and in
period two the state is either autocracy or democracy and is denoted by S ∈ {A,D}. ere are
two types of (exogenous) income in the economy: private income and natural resource rents.
Each period citizens receive state-dependent private income, and the government receives
natural resource rents in the amount of Rt ≥ 0.
44 Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006),
we assume that there are two groups of citizens, the rich and the poor.45 e individual private
incomes of the rich and the poor in state S are yr
S
and y
p
S
, respectively. e total population of
citizens is normalized to unity, and a fraction δ are rich, where δ < 1/2. Total private income
coincides with average private income and is equal to y¯S = δy
r
S
+ (1 − δ )y
p
S
. Leing φ denote
the fraction of total income held by the rich, the per capita incomes of the rich and poor can
be wrien as
yrS =
φy¯S
δ
and y
p
S
=
(1 − φ)y¯S
1 − δ
, (A.1)
where φ > δ . All citizens are risk neutral.
Private income is potentially taxed under both autocracy and democracy. Under autocracy
citizens receive group-speciﬁc transfers, or “bribes,” from the autocrat, whereas under democ-
racy all citizens receive a lump-sum transfer of equal size. us the indirect utilities of citizen
i in states A and D, respectively, are
V iA = (1 − τA)y
i
A + b
i and V iD = (1 − τD)y
i
D +T ,
where τS is the tax rate, b
i is the group-speciﬁc bribe, and T is the lump-sum transfer. ere
is an aggregate cost of taxation that is proportional to total income, C(τS )y¯S . We assume that
costs are low at low levels of taxation and are increasing and convex for strictly positive tax
rates: C(0) = 0, C′(·) > 0, and C′′(·) > 0. We also assume C′(0) = 0 and C′(1) = 1 to ensure an
interior solution to the problem that follows. e capacity to tax is nil in period one, but τS
may be positive in period two.
Under democracy tax revenue and resource rents are shared equally among the citizens.
44For example, natural resource rents could arrive in the form of proﬁts from state-owned resource ﬁrms or
royalties paid by international resource ﬁrms.
45In contrast to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), here the rich group is separate from the ruling elite and can
potentially challenge the power of the elite.
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us period-two transfers satisfy the budget constraint,
T ≤ (τD −C(τD))y¯D + R2.
e (deposed) autocrat receives income normalized to zero.
Under autocracy the autocrat conﬁscates the tax revenue and resource rents.46 However,
there are transaction costs associated with stealing government revenue, so the autocrat
receives only a fraction (1−θ ) of government revenue, where θ ∈ [0, 1]. Transaction costs may
stem from transparency of the budget or administrative procedures (Persson and Tabellini,
2000). More generally, transaction costs depend on the strength of accountability groups which
constrain executive power.47 e greater is the capacity of accountability groups to constrain
the executive’s ability to act unilaterally, the higher is θ . Let aggregate bribes be denoted by
b = δbr + (1 − δ )bp . When the autocrat makes aggregate bribes in the amount of b, he incurs a
cost of (1+γ )b in period one and group i enjoys the beneﬁts of bi in period two.48 Similar to θ ,
the parameter γ > 0 captures the marginal transaction cost of making bribes and depends on
executive constraints. Assume that the autocrat is risk neutral and discounts future utility by
the factor β ∈ (0, 1), where β > φ. e autocrat’s indirect utility in period t under autocracy is
equal to consumption, ct , where
0 ≤ c1 ≤ (1 − θ )R1 − (1 + γ )b
and 0 ≤ c2 ≤ (1 − θ ) [R2 + (τA −C(τA))y¯A] .
Note that we have assumed that the autocrat is credit-constrained. is is a reasonable
assumption to a ﬁrst approximation: the more unilateral authority the ruler has, the less likely
he is to be compelled to repay a loan, making him a risky borrower.49
46Using data on deposits to oﬀshore bank accounts, Andersen et al. (2017) show that political elites appropriate
oil rents in oil-rich autocracies but not in oil-rich democracies.
47A powerful legislature and an independent judiciary are archetypal accountability groups, but in nondemoc-
racies executive accountability may derive from other sources. In a one-party government the executive may be
constrained by senior oﬃcials in the ruling party. In a monarchy a council of nobles may provide a check on
the king’s power. e military may even provide a counterbalance in coup-prone polities (Marshall and Gurr,
2014). Finally, powerful producer groups, such as the cale ranchers in Botswana, can restrain executive power
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2003). Strong accountability groups force the autocrat to use convoluted,
opaque methods of stealing the rents, costing the autocrat θRt . Alternatively, one can think of θ as the fraction of
rents the autocrat must pay to accountability groups as bribes in exchange for keeping a fraction 1 − θ of the
rents. Interpreting the allocation of rents as the result of a Nash bargaining game, θ represents the bargaining
power of accountability groups relative to the ruler.
48is timing assumption could capture the fact that many potential group-speciﬁc transfers—public em-
ployment, targeted public goods, or exclusive production rights—are enjoyed with a time lag. e autocrat’s
period-one cost of providing b could reﬂect an upfront investment cost or an opportunity cost of guaranteeing
liquidity in period two.
49See, for example, North and Weingast (1989).
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A.1.2 e Political Game
Timing. e timing of events is as follows. In the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the autocrat
receives (1 − θ )R1 and announces period-two policies (τA,b
r
,bp). We assume that the autocrat
can fully commit to period-two policies in period one.50 Tax policy is set with a one-period
delay, so the autocrat can only choose period-two taxes.51 At the end of the ﬁrst period, the
citizens decide whether to stage a revolution to depose the autocrat. We assume that the
revolution succeeds if and only if both groups of citizens participate. A group of citizens
participate in the revolution if and only if their period-two payoﬀ under democracy strictly
exceeds their period-two payoﬀ under autocracy, given the (binding) promises of the autocrat.
We assume that citizens can commit to their period-two rebellion decision in period one. If the
revolution succeeds, then the state transitions to democracy, the autocrat receives zero income,
and rich and poor citizens vote on the tax rate and transfers and receive payoﬀs V r
D
and V
p
D
.
If the revolution fails, then the autocrat stays in power, implements policies (τA,b
r
,bp), and
receives (1 − θ ) [R2 + (τA −C(τA))y¯A]; and rich and poor citizens receive payoﬀs V
r
A
and V
p
A
.
Period-two equilibrium. To characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we
work backwards and ﬁrst consider the Nash equilibrium starting in period two. If the state
is autocracy in the second period, then each player’s strategy and payoﬀ is determined by
policy commitments made in the ﬁrst period. Citizen i receives (1− τA)y
i
A
+bi and the autocrat
receives (1 − θ ) [R2 + (τA −C(τA))y¯A].
If the state is democracy in the second period, then citizens vote on the tax rate, τD , and
the level of lump-sum transfers, T . Because utility is strictly increasing in transfers (all else
equal), the budget constraint will always bind: T = (τD −C(τD))y¯D + R2. For a given value of
τD , the payoﬀ of citizen i under democracy is
(1 − τD)y
i
D + (τD −C(τD))y¯D + R2. (A.2)
Let τ i
D
denote the most preferred tax rate of citizen i . Because there are no public goods in
this economy, the sole function of the tax is redistribution. erefore, τ r
D
= 0. Substituting
(A.1) into (A.2), it is straightforward to show that the most preferred tax rate of a poor citizen
satisﬁes
C′(τ
p
D
) =
φ − δ
1 − δ
.
It follows from our assumptions that τ
p
D
∈ (0, 1) and τ
p
D
is increasing in the amount of inequality,
φ. It is possible to show that both poor and rich citizens have single-peaked preferences over
50us we abstract from the possibility that democratization could result from the elite’s inability to commit to
future policy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
51Taxation requires signiﬁcant investments in the government’s ability to monitor citizens and enforce the tax
code (Besley and Persson, 2011). For simplicity we capture this fact by assuming that tax policy is implemented
with a delay, abstracting from investment costs.
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τD .
52 Suppose that under democracy τD is chosen by pairwisemajority voting in an environment
with no uncertainty. en by the median-voter theorem, the most preferred policy of the
median voter, τ
p
D
, is selected (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957). e equilibrium payoﬀ to citizen i
under democracy is then
V iD = (1 − τ
p
D
)yiD + (τ
p
D
−C(τ
p
D
))y¯D + R2.
Period-one equilibrium. At the end of period one, each citizen chooses whether to
participate in the revolution, given the period-two equilibrium policies under autocracy,
(τA,b
r
,bp), and under democracy, (τ
p
D
,T ). Citizen i participates in the revolution if and only if
V i
D
> V i
A
. Equivalently, for each value of τA, citizen i participates in the revolution if and only
if bi < b˜i(τA), where
b˜i(τA) = (1 − τ
p
D
)yiD + (τ
p
D
−C(τ
p
D
))y¯D + R2 − (1 − τA)y
i
A.
Note that b˜i(τA) is strictly increasing in τA: increasing the tax rate under autocracy causes citizen
i to demand a larger reservation bribe in exchange for not rebelling. e following assumption
ensures that democracy is suﬃciently appealing relative to autocracy that b˜i(τA) > 0 for any
R2 and τA.
Assumption A.1. Gi ≡ (1 − τ
p
D
)yi
D
+ (τ
p
D
−C(τ
p
D
))y¯D − y
i
A
> 0 for i ∈ {r ,p}.
In the beginning of period one, the autocrat chooses period-two policies, (τA,b
r
,bp), to
maximize his lifetime discounted utility, taking the strategies of citizens as given. Leing
(τA,b
r
,bp) ∈ P, the function ρ : P 7→ {0, 1} indicates whether the revolution is prevented,
where ρ(τA,b
r
,bp) = 1 indicates prevention. e autocrat’s problem is
max
τA,br ,bp
(1 − θ )R1 − (1 + γ )b + ρ(τA,b
r
,bp)β(1 − θ ) [R2 + (τA −C(τA))y¯A]
subject to b = δbr + (1 − δ )bp
(1 + γ )b ≤ (1 − θ )R1
ρ(τA,b
r
,bp) =


1 if br ≥ b˜r (τA) or b
p ≥ b˜p(τA)
0 otherwise.
Strictly speaking, R2 denotes expected period-two resource rents from the perspective of period
one.
For each τA it is optimal for the autocrat to pay bribes (b
r
,bp), withbi > 0 for some i ∈ {r ,p},
if and only if three conditions are satisﬁed:
52e strict convexity of C(·) guarantees that the indirect utility function is strictly concave in τ . is is a
suﬃcient condition for preferences to be single-peaked.
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(i) Suﬃciency: ρ(τA,b
r
,bp) = 1
(ii) Feasibility: (1 + γ )b ≤ (1 − θ )R1
(iii) Desirability: (1 + γ )b ≤ β(1 − θ ) [R2 + (τA −C(τA))y¯A].
e bribes are suﬃcient if they prevent the revolution, they are feasible if the autocrat has
enough income in period one to cover the cost of the bribes, and they are desirable if the
autocrat’s expected beneﬁt from staying in power exceeds the cost of the bribes. If no set of
bribes satisfy all three conditions, the autocrat sets br = bp = 0 and the state transitions to
democracy in period two.
If the autocrat chooses to pay bribes to avert a revolution, it is optimal to bribe only one
group of citizens. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the rich are cheaper to bribe than
the poor.
Assumption A.2. δb˜r (τA) ≤ (1 − δ )b˜
p(τA) for all τA ∈ [0, 1].
is assumption is reasonable because the rich are less numerous and have more to lose
from democracy than the poor.53 Assumption A.2 is more likely to hold the smaller is δ and
the larger are τ
p
D
, R2, and y¯A. When the autocrat chooses to pay bribes, he will pay each rich
citizen exactly b˜r (τA) so that b = δb˜
r (τA).
We make the following parametric assumptions for γ .
Assumption A.3. β/φ − 1 < γ < β/δ − 1.
e ﬁrst inequality rules out the situation in which the autocrat both taxes and bribes
the rich citizens in order to prevent a revolution. To see this, note that when b = δb˜r (τA),
the autocrat’s marginal cost of increasing τA is (1 + γ )φy¯A, while his marginal beneﬁt is
β(1 − θ )(1 − C′(τA))y¯A. Assumption A.3 guarantees that the marginal cost of increasing τA
exceeds the marginal beneﬁt for all values of τA and θ . us the autocrat will set τA = 0
whenever b = δb˜r (τA). e second inequality guarantees that a threshold value θ
∗(γ ), which
will be described below, is strictly positive.
Noting that ρ(0, b˜r (0), 0) = 1 and b˜r (0) = Gr + R2, where G
r is deﬁned in Assumption A.1,
the autocrat will set τA = 0 and b = δb˜
r (0) if and only if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) Feasibility: δ (1 + γ )(Gr + R2) ≤ (1 − θ )R1
(ii) Desirability: δ (1 + γ )(Gr + R2) ≤ β(1 − θ )R2.
e following deﬁnitions are useful for studying the comparative statics of the model.
Deﬁnition A.4. A resource boom is an increase in both R1 and R2.
53Note that the assumption is weaker than assuming that b˜r (τA) ≤ b˜
p (τA) for all τA ∈ [0, 1], because δ < 1/2.
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Deﬁnition A.5. In an economy with parameter values (δ ,γ , θ ), a balanced resource boom is
a resource boom that satisﬁes
∆R2
∆R1
<
1 − θ
δ (1 + γ )
.
Because an increase in R2 increases the aractiveness of democracy to the citizens, if the
increase in R2 far exceeds the increase in R1, the autocrat will be unable to pay the reservation
bribe of the rich. In contrast, a balanced resource boom increases the likelihood that the
feasibility constraint is satisﬁed, because the increase in R2 is not “too large” relative to the
increase in R1. Because Assumption A.3 implies that δ (1 + γ ) < β , a balanced resource boom
could involve ∆R2 > ∆R1. Note that a resource boom is more likely to be balanced the smaller
are γ and θ .
A.1.3 Results
We are now ready to state the main results.
Proposition A.6. For each γ there exists a threshold value θ ∗(γ ) ∈ (0, 1) such that for θ < θ ∗(γ ),
a balanced resource boom makes the transition to democracy less likely, the lower is θ . For
θ ≥ θ ∗(γ ) the state transitions to democracy for any (R1,R2) ≥ 0.
Proof. First note that the feasibility constraint is satisﬁed because the resource boom is balanced.
Let θ ∗(γ ) = 1 − δ (1 + γ )/β , which is in (0, 1) by Assumption A.3. When θ < θ ∗(γ ), we have
that β(1 − θ ) − δ (1 + γ ) is positive and decreasing in θ . is means that an increase in R2
increases the likelihood that the desirability constraint is satisﬁed, and the marginal eﬀect of
R2 on desirability is decreasing in θ . When θ ≥ θ
∗(γ ), the desirability constraint is always
violated. 
Proposition A.6 states that a balanced increase in resource rents will lower the chances
of democratization when constraints on the ruler are suﬃciently weak. However, when
constraints are strong, no resource boom can impede democratization. e assumption that
the autocrat is credit-constrained necessitates that the resource boom be balanced. Note that
both types of marginal transaction costs induced by executive constraints, γ and θ , maer for
the outcome. For example, lowering γ (subject to Assumption A.3 holding) increases θ ∗(γ ),
raising the likelihood that a balanced resource boom impedes democratization for a given
value of θ .
Corollary A.7. ere exists a threshold value θ ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for θ < θ ∗, a balanced resource
boom is more likely to result in zero tax revenue, the lower is θ . For θ ≥ θ ∗ taxes are positive for
any (R1,R2) ≥ 0.
Proof. e result follows immediately from Proposition A.6 by noting that under autocracy,
τA = 0, while under democracy, τD = τ
p
D
> 0. 
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e prediction of Corollary A.7 contrasts with that of the ﬁscal capacity model of Besley
and Persson (2011). In their model political transitions are exogenous and taxation is used
either to fund a public good or to redistribute income to the group in power. An increase
in resource wealth leads to lower taxes only when institutions are “cohesive,” i.e., θ is large.
is is because in their model tax revenue is spent on the public good when institutions are
cohesive, and the diminishing marginal utility of the public good implies that tax revenue
is less valuable aer a resource windfall that relaxes the budget constraint. For small values
of θ , resource wealth does not aﬀect equilibrium taxation in their model. In our model the
mechanism determining the tax rate is quite diﬀerent: the political transition is endogenous,
and equilibrium taxation depends on the incumbent’s ability and willingness to use patronage
to remain in power. Figure A.16 graphically demonstrates how the eﬀect of a resource boom
on the suppression decision depends on the strength of executive constraints.
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A.2 Tables
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Table A.1: Variable Descriptions and Sources
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Democracy, 2008 POLITY2 index in 2008, normalized to take values between zero and one Polity IV
Avg. Democracy, 1966–2008 Average normalized POLITY2 index from 1966–2008 in years in which the country was independent Polity IV
Corruption, 2008 Recoded corruption index in 2008 ranging from 0 to 6, with higher numbers indicating more corruption PRS
Internal Conﬂict, 1966–2008 Internal or internationalized internal armed conﬂicts per year in which country was independent from 1966–2008 UCDP/PRIO
Coup Aempts, 1966–2008 (Failed or successful) coup aempts per year in which country was independent from 1966–2008 Polity IV
Purges, 1966–2008 Political purges per year in which country was independent from 1966–2008 CNTS
Total Revenue, 2000–2008 Log of average government revenue share of GDP from 2000–2008 ICTD
Tax Revenue, 2000–2008 Log of average tax revenue share of GDP from 2000–2008 ICTD
GDP, 2008 Log of GDP per capita in 2008 in constant 2011 international dollars WDI
Non-Oil GDP, 2008 Log of non-oil GDP per capita in 2008 in constant 2011 international dollars WDI
Non-Oil/Gas GDP, 2008 Log of non-oil/gas GDP per capita in 2008 in constant 2011 international dollars WDI
Non-Resource GDP, 2008 Log of non-resource GDP per capita in 2008 in constant 2011 international dollars WDI
Manufacturing GDP, 2008 Log of manufacturing value added per capita in 2008 in constant 2011 international dollars WDI
Population Density, 2008 Log of population in 2008 divided by land area Maddison, GIS
Executive Constraints, 1950–1966 Average XCONST index from 1950–1965 aer normalizing XCONST to take values between zero and one Polity IV
Weak Constraints, 1950–1966 Indicates having averaged three points or fewer out of seven on XCONST from 1950–1965 Polity IV
Oil Production, 1966–2008 Log of average annual metric tons of oil produced per 1000 inhabitants from 1966–2008 Ross
Oil Endowment Log of total oil endowment in millions of barrels per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 ASPO
Basin Type Area Log of sovereign area covered by a type of basin in square km per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 (see Tables A.3, A.4, A.5) Tellus
Land Area Log of land area in square km per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 GIS
Coastline Log of length of coastline in km per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 CIA
Mountainous Area Log of mountainous land area in square km per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 FL
Tropical Area Log of land area falling within tropics in square km per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 GSM
Good Soil Area Log of land area containing “good” soil in square km per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 GAEZ
Notes. Polity IV stands for the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Gurr, 2014; Marshall and Marshall, 2016). PRS stands for Political Risk Services. UCDP/PRIO stands for the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). CNTS stands for Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson, 2016). ICTD stands for International
Centre for Tax and Development (Prichard et al., 2014). WDI stands for the World Bank World Development Indicators. Maddison stands for the Maddison Project (Maddison,
2013). Ross stands for Ross (2013). ASPO stands for Association for the Study of Peak Oil. WOGR stands for the World Oil and Gas Review published by ENI (ENI, 2015). Tellus
stands for the Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013) Tellus GIS database. GIS stands for author’s calculation using ArcGIS. CIA stands for CIA World Factbook (CIA, 2015). FL stands for
Fearon and Laitin (2003). GSM stands for Gallup et al. (1998). GAEZ stands for the FAO’s Global Agro-Ecological Zones database (version 3.0) (Fischer et al., 2002).
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Table A.2: Variable Descriptions and Sources (Continued)
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Urbanization, 1850 Urbanization rate in 1850 Chandler
British Legal Origin Equals one if the country has a British legal origin, and zero otherwise Easterly
Communist Legacy Equals one if the country has a legacy of communism, and zero otherwise Kornai
Percentage Christian, 1950 Percentage of the population that was Christian in 1950 WRD
Percentage Muslim, 1950 Percentage of the population that was Muslim in 1950 WRD
Percentage Hindu, 1950 Percentage of the population that was Hindu in 1950 WRD
Ethnic Fractionalization 1 −
∑N
i=1 s
2
i j , where si j is the share of ethnic group i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } in country j Alesina et al.
Religious Fractionalization 1 −
∑N
i=1 s
2
i j , where si j is the share of religious group i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } in country j Alesina et al.
Linguistic Fractionalization 1 −
∑N
i=1 s
2
i j , where si j is the share of linguistic group i ∈ {1, . . . ,N } in country j Alesina et al.
Notes. Chandler stands for Chandler (1987). Easterly stands for William Easterly’s Global Development Network Growth Database (Easterly, 2001). Kornai stands for Kornai
(1992). WRD stands for the World Religion Database (Johnson and Grim, 2017). Alesina et al. stands for Alesina et al. (2003).
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Table A.3: Fugro Robertson Global Basin Classiﬁcation Codes
Sub-Regime Group Code Sub-Regime Name
Convergent (Continent-Continent) C.1.F Peripheral Foreland (Continent-Continent)
C.1.F(p) Peripheral Foreland with Piggyback (Continent-Continent)
C.1.POE Late to Post-Orogenic Extension (Continent-Continent)
C.1.SOE Syn-Orogenic Extensional (Continent-Continent)
C.1.TOC Trapped Oceanic Crustal Sag (Continent-Continent)
C.1.W Intramontane Wrench (Continent-Continent)
Convergent (Ocean-Continent) C.2.E Retro-Arc Extensional (Ocean-Continent)
C.2.F Retro-Arc Foreland (Ocean-Continent)
C.2.FA Fore-Arc (Ocean-Continent)
C.2.S Retro-Arc Post-Extensional Sag (Ocean-Continent)
C.2.W Arc-Related Wrench (Ocean-Continent)
Convergent (Ocean-Ocean) C.3.E Retro-Arc Extensional (Ocean-Ocean)
C.3.F Retro-Arc Foreland (Ocean-Ocean)
C.3.FA Fore-Arc (Ocean-Ocean)
C.3.S Retro-Arc Post-Extensional Sag (Ocean-Ocean)
C.3.W Arc-Related Wrench (Ocean-Ocean)
Divergent D.1 Ri
D.2 Intracratonic Sag
D.3 Post-Ri Sag
D.3(i) Post-Ri Sag with Inversion
D.4 Passive Margin
D.4(i) Passive Margin with Inversion
Wrench W.1 Intracratonic Wrench
W.2 Wrench (Ocean-Continent)
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Table A.4: Grouping by Plate-Tectonic Environment and Primary Subsidence Mechanism
Number Tectonics Subsidence Basin Aggregation in Group
1 Convergent C-C Mechanical C.1.F + C.1.F(p) + C.1.SOE + C.1.W
2 Convergent C-C ermo-Mechanical C.1.POE + C.1.TOC
3 Convergent O-C Mechanical C.2.E + C.2.F + C.2.FA + C.2.W
4 Convergent O-C ermal C.2.S
5 Convergent O-O Mechanical or ermal C.3.E + C.3.F + C.3.FA + C.3.S + C.3.W
6 Divergent Mechanical D.1
7 Divergent ermal D.2 + D.3 + D.3(i) + D.4 + D.4(i)
8 Wrench Mechanical W.1 + W.2
Notes. e categorization is from Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013). See Table A.3 for the basin types associated with
each code. In “C-C,” “O-C,” and “O-O,” “C” stands for continent, and “O” stands for “Ocean.”
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Table A.5: Grouping by Final Component of Fugro Tellus Code
Number Group Name Basin Aggregation in Group
1 Foreland C.1.F + C.1.F(p) + C.2.F + C.3.F
2 Fore-Arc C.2.FA + C.3.FA
3 Extensional C.1.POE + C.1.SOE + C.2.E + C.3.E
4 Convergent Sag C.1.TOC + C.2.S + C.3.S
5 Convergent Wrench C.1.W + C.2.W + C.3.W
6 Ri D.1
7 Intracratonic Sag D.2
8 Post-Ri Sag D.3 + D.3(i)
9 Passive Margin D.4 + D.4(i)
10 Wrench W.1 + W.2
Notes. e categorization is from Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013). See Table A.3 for the basin types associated with
each code.
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Table A.6: Total Basin Coverage of Sovereign Area by Region
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
East Asia and the Paciﬁc 0.39 0.25 0.00 0.75 20
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.67 0.28 0.13 1.00 23
Rest of Europe and Neo-Europes 0.57 0.32 0.00 1.00 26
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.56 0.22 0.12 0.99 30
Middle East and North Africa 0.86 0.20 0.35 1.00 21
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.44 0.28 0.00 0.90 45
South Asia 0.55 0.32 0.03 1.00 7
Total 0.56 0.30 0.00 1.00 172
Notes. is table summarizes the portion of country sovereign area containing any type of sedimentary basin.
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Table A.7: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Democracy, 2008 0.69 0.32 0.00 1.00 157
Democracy, 1966 0.44 0.38 0.00 1.00 117
Avg. democracy, 1966–2008 0.53 0.31 0.00 1.00 160
Corruption, 2008 3.44 1.18 0.00 6.00 136
Internal conﬂicts per year, 1966–2008 0.21 0.48 0.00 3.86 172
Coup aempts per year, 1966–2008 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.35 160
Purges per year, 1966–2008 0.06 0.13 0.00 1.12 172
Total revenue, 2000–2008 (log avg.) −1.53 0.45 −3.05 −0.54 165
Tax revenue, 2000–2008 (log avg.) −1.97 0.69 −5.03 −0.77 167
GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.06 1.26 6.36 11.71 166
GDP, 1966 (log p.c.) 7.69 1.00 6.05 10.37 136
Non-Oil GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.27 1.16 6.33 11.46 132
Non-Oil/Gas GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 9.28 1.15 6.33 11.45 129
Non-Resource GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 8.93 1.30 5.92 11.45 166
Manufacturing GDP, 2008 (log p.c.) 6.99 1.51 2.61 9.54 145
Population density, 2008 (log) −2.77 1.34 −6.25 1.91 153
Executive constraints, 1950–1965 0.47 0.37 0.00 1.00 116
Oil production, 1966–2008 (log avg. p.c.) −4.88 4.24 −9.03 4.45 172
Oil discovery, 1966–2003 (log avg. p.c.) −9.03 3.24 −11.14 1.73 172
Oil reserves, 1966–2003 (log avg. p.c.) −5.26 3.14 −7.30 4.69 172
Oil endowment (log p.c.) −10.17 2.76 −11.93 −0.31 172
Oil quality 3.44 3.28 1.00 10.44 127
Convergent C-C mechanical area (log p.c.) −8.36 2.97 −10.34 0.20 172
Convergent O-C thermal area (log p.c.) −8.85 0.70 −8.99 −4.22 172
Convergent O-C mechanical area (log p.c.) −9.62 3.69 −11.92 −1.06 172
Convergent O-O area (log p.c.) −9.80 2.38 −10.66 −0.31 172
Divergent thermal area (log p.c.) −6.51 4.91 −13.75 1.27 172
Wrench mechanical area (log p.c.) −13.25 3.66 −14.94 −0.73 172
Divergent mechanical area (log p.c.) −10.64 2.68 −12.10 −2.02 172
Convergent C-C thermo-mechanical area (log p.c.) −8.52 0.92 −8.75 −2.91 172
Foreland area (log p.c.) −7.07 2.93 −9.60 0.20 172
Intracratonic sag area (log p.c.) −11.00 5.21 −14.70 −0.03 172
Passive margin area (log p.c.) −8.78 5.19 −13.75 1.27 172
Convergent sag area (log p.c.) −15.09 3.20 −16.14 −2.91 172
Post-ri sag area (log p.c.) −10.18 3.56 −12.52 −0.73 172
Wrench area (log p.c.) −13.25 3.66 −14.94 −0.73 172
Extensional area (log p.c.) −9.90 2.07 −10.68 −1.60 172
Convergent wrench area (log p.c.) −11.67 3.20 −13.12 −0.32 172
Fore-arc area (log p.c.) −10.35 3.16 −11.92 −0.80 172
Ri area (log p.c.) −10.64 2.68 −12.10 −2.02 172
Land area (log p.c.) −3.23 1.58 −7.79 0.49 172
Coastline (log p.c.) −9.35 2.99 −14.01 −3.17 172
Mountainous area (log p.c.) −6.54 2.99 −11.21 −0.53 172
Tropical area (log p.c.) −6.21 3.85 −10.47 −0.08 172
Good soil area (log p.c.) −6.79 2.64 −11.49 −0.37 172
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. Due to the presence of zero values, the “log”
transformation of the oil and geographic variables is actually a diﬀerentiable and monotonic transformation
h(w) = log(w) for w > w0 and h(w) = log(w0) − 1 +w/w0 for w ≤ w0. is function was suggested by James
Hamilton of UC San Diego. In practicew0 is chosen for each variable as the minimum positive value observed in
the sample.
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Table A.8: First-Stage Estimates for Optimal Sets of Basin Measures by Plate-Tectonic Environment and Primary Mechanism of Subsidence
Log Avg. Oil Production per capita, 1966–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Convergent C-C mechanical 0.599∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.126) (0.127)
Convergent O-C thermal 0.589∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗ 0.340∗ 0.285 0.267 0.271
(0.175) (0.168) (0.176) (0.185) (0.194) (0.194)
Convergent O-C mechanical 0.359∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.087) (0.088) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091)
Convergent O-O −0.362∗∗ −0.377∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗ −0.345∗∗ −0.341∗∗ −0.341∗∗
(0.139) (0.142) (0.149) (0.151) (0.152) (0.153)
Divergent thermal 0.058 0.062 0.060 0.059
(0.069) (0.069) (0.071) (0.071)
Wrench mechanical 0.070 0.073 0.075
(0.072) (0.074) (0.075)
Divergent mechanical 0.026 0.026
(0.116) (0.117)
Convergent C-C thermo-mechanical 0.059
(0.327)
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
R2 0.318 0.327 0.394 0.398 0.400 0.403 0.404 0.404
F statistic 25.3 17.6 18.9 16.5 14.0 12.6 10.8 9.4
Notes. See Tables A.3 and A.4 in the online appendix for basin variable deﬁnitions. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for other variable deﬁnitions. e F statistic is the
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area,
coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: First-Stage Estimates for Optimal Sets of Basin Measures by Final Component of Fugro Tellus Code
Log Avg. Oil Production per capita, 1966–2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Foreland 0.576∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.143) (0.139) (0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.141) (0.139) (0.142) (0.142)
Intracratonic sag 0.213∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077)
Passive margin 0.091 0.102 0.080 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.080
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077)
Convergent sag 0.199∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Post-ri sag 0.231∗∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.101) (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103) (0.106)
Wrench 0.119 0.119 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.129
(0.079) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079)
Extensional −0.196 −0.182 −0.199 −0.224
(0.173) (0.172) (0.180) (0.188)
Convergent wrench −0.049 −0.069 −0.061
(0.118) (0.110) (0.109)
Fore-arc 0.077 0.077
(0.107) (0.105)
Ri 0.084
(0.107)
Observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
R2 0.315 0.357 0.364 0.383 0.409 0.415 0.420 0.421 0.422 0.424
F statistic 16.4 17.0 14.4 12.6 11.7 10.3 9.5 8.4 7.4 6.6
Notes. See Tables A.3 and A.5 in the online appendix for basin variable deﬁnitions. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for other variable deﬁnitions. e F statistic is the
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area,
coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Testing for a Political Resource Curse (Controlling for Ethnic Fractionalization)
Democracy, Avg. Democracy, Corruption, Internal Conﬂict, Coup Aempts, Purges, Total Revenue, Tax Revenue,
2008 1966–2008 2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 2000–2008 2000–2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production −0.019∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.030 0.011∗ 0.001 0.003 0.035∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012)
Observations 156 159 135 171 159 171 164 166
R2 0.439 0.537 0.336 0.216 0.207 0.093 0.510 0.479
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production −0.040∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.003 0.002 −0.000 0.027 −0.165∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.015) (0.060) (0.019) (0.003) (0.005) (0.017) (0.041)
Observations 156 159 135 171 159 171 164 166
F statistic 22.4 24.6 21.3 28.0 24.6 28.0 26.2 24.4
A-R 95% CI [−0.086,−0.009] [−0.080,−0.014] [0.023, 0.282] [−0.038, 0.041] [−0.004, 0.010] [−0.011, 0.011] [−0.009, 0.061] [−0.279,−0.099]
Oil exog. 0.181 0.059 0.058 0.664 0.579 0.476 0.613 0.001
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls
(tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95% conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the
null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the presence of weak instruments.
e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Testing for an Economic Resource Course (Controlling for Ethnic Fractionalization)
GDP, Non-Oil Non-Oil/Gas Non-Resource Manufacturing
2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production 0.097∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 165 131 128 165 144
R2 0.674 0.637 0.621 0.667 0.618
Panel B: Two-Stage Least Squares
Oil production 0.091∗∗ 0.059 0.052 0.070∗ −0.005
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.075)
Observations 165 131 128 165 144
F statistic 26.1 18.8 18.4 26.1 11.9
A-R 95% CI [0.008, 0.177] [−0.030, 0.156] [−0.038, 0.148] [−0.015, 0.157] [−0.220, 0.139]
Oil exog. 0.878 0.773 0.846 0.883 0.186
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls
(land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed
eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e A-R 95%
conﬁdence interval is based on the Anderson and Rubin (1949) χ 2 test of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
on the endogenous variables in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. e A-R test is robust to the
presence of weak instruments. e p-value of the test of the endogeneity of oil wealth is from the Hansen
(1982) overidentiﬁcation test of the null hypothesis that oil wealth is exogenous. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Testing for a Political Resource Curse: Basin vs. Endowment
Democracy, Avg. Democracy, Corruption, Internal Conﬂict, Coup Aempts, Purges, Total Revenue, Tax Revenue,
2008 1966–2008 2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 2000–2008 2000–2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production −0.019∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.032 0.012∗∗ 0.001 0.003 0.032∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
R2 0.441 0.536 0.334 0.204 0.203 0.093 0.463 0.471
Panel B: 2SLS using Endowment
Oil production −0.026∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.034 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.043∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.024) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.017)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
F statistic 326.8 350.4 286.1 409.6 350.4 409.6 401.2 395.2
Panel C: 2SLS using Basin
Oil production −0.038∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.007 0.002 −0.001 0.021 −0.163∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.060) (0.018) (0.003) (0.005) (0.016) (0.039)
Observations 157 160 136 172 160 172 165 167
F statistic 25.3 26.7 23.2 31.4 26.7 31.4 29.3 27.3
Overident. p-value 0.418 0.084 0.063 0.752 0.547 0.708 0.129 0.003
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. Panel A presents OLS estimates for comparison. Panel B presents IV estimates using initial oil endowment
as an instrument for oil production. Panel C presents IV estimates using Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) rk
statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e Hansen (1982) overidentiﬁcation test p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that both
Endowment and Basin are valid instruments. Assuming that Basin is a valid instrument, rejection implies that Endowment is endogenous. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.13: Testing for an Economic Resource Course: Basin vs. Endowment
GDP, Non-Oil Non-Oil/Gas Non-Resource Manufacturing
2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares
Oil production 0.092∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
R2 0.661 0.623 0.608 0.657 0.599
Panel B: 2SLS using Endowment
Oil production 0.114∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
F statistic 407.9 224.3 424.4 407.9 322.3
Panel C: 2SLS using Basin
Oil production 0.074∗ 0.045 0.039 0.054 −0.037
(0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.075)
Observations 166 132 129 166 145
F statistic 29.3 20.4 20.1 29.3 14.3
Overident. p-value 0.273 0.587 0.563 0.373 0.093
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. Panel A presents OLS estimates for com-
parison. Panel B presents IV estimates using initial oil endowment as an instrument for oil production. Panel
C presents IV estimates using Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. e Hansen (1982)
overidentiﬁcation test p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that both Endowment and Basin are valid
instruments. Assuming that Basin is a valid instrument, rejection implies that Endowment is endogenous. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Political Resource Curse: Heterogeneous Eﬀects by Initial Institutional ality
Democracy, Avg. Democracy, Corruption, Internal Conﬂict, Coup Aempts, Purges, Total Revenue, Tax Revenue,
2008 1966–2008 2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 1966–2008 2000–2008 2000–2008
Panel A: Countries with Relatively Strong Executive Constraints from 1950–1965
Oil production −0.027 −0.009 −0.054 0.010 −0.000 0.018 0.057∗∗ −0.012
(0.019) (0.018) (0.070) (0.037) (0.005) (0.012) (0.025) (0.030)
Observations 53 54 51 54 54 54 52 53
F statistic 4.2 5.5 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.1 4.2
Panel B: Countries with Relatively Weak Executive Constraints from 1950–1965
Oil production −0.044∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.033 0.035∗∗ 0.007 0.013∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.045) (0.017) (0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.047)
Observations 60 62 54 62 62 62 58 60
F statistic 10.2 12.7 10.6 12.7 12.7 12.7 11.1 12.4
Panel C: Diﬀerence between Estimates
Diﬀerence 0.017 0.013 −0.087 −0.025 −0.007 0.005 −0.014 0.096
(0.054) (0.029) (0.134) (0.063) (0.010) (0.025) (0.072) (0.079)
p-value 0.754 0.658 0.518 0.689 0.491 0.836 0.846 0.227
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls
(tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. Column titles refer to the sample of countries used in the regression. Countries in the
“Strong” subsample averaged strictly greater than three points out of seven on the executive constraints index, XCONST (Polity IV), from 1950–1965. Countries in the “Weak”
subsample averaged three points or fewer out of seven on XCONST from 1950–1965. A score of three points for XCONST indicates “slight to moderate limitation on executive
authority” (Polity IV). In practice “Weak” indicates having an average XCONST score equal to or below the median average XCONST score from 1950–1965. e standard
errors and p-values in Panel C are calculated by a bootstrap procedure based on 200 repetitions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.15: Economic Resource Curse: Heterogeneous Eﬀects by Initial Institutional ality
GDP, Non-Oil Non-Oil/Gas Non-Resource Manufacturing
2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008 GDP, 2008
Panel A: Countries with Relatively Strong Executive Constraints from 1950–1965
Oil production 0.117 0.061 0.059 0.104 0.122
(0.075) (0.066) (0.068) (0.078) (0.118)
Observations 51 46 45 51 50
F statistic 3.4 2.2 2.1 3.4 3.3
Panel B: Countries with Relatively Weak Executive Constraints from 1950–1965
Oil production 0.152∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.055) (0.053) (0.045) (0.057)
Observations 59 48 47 59 50
F statistic 12.0 6.9 7.0 12.0 6.8
Panel C: Diﬀerence between Estimates
Diﬀerence −0.035 −0.048 −0.045 −0.029 −0.027
(0.112) (0.168) (0.137) (0.114) (0.284)
p-value 0.753 0.774 0.745 0.800 0.925
Notes. See Table A.1 in the online appendix for variable deﬁnitions. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls
(land area, coastline, and mountainous area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed
eﬀects. e IV speciﬁcations use Basin as an instrument for oil production. e F statistic is the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) rk statistic, which tests for weak identiﬁcation and is robust to heteroskedasticity. Column titles
refer to the sample of countries used in the regression. Countries in the “Strong” subsample averaged strictly
greater than three points out of seven on the executive constraints index, XCONST (Polity IV), from 1950–1965.
Countries in the “Weak” subsample averaged three points or fewer out of seven on XCONST from 1950–1965. A
score of three points for XCONST indicates “slight to moderate limitation on executive authority” (Polity IV).
In practice “Weak” indicates having an average XCONST score equal to or below the median average XCONST
score from 1950–1965. e standard errors and p-values in Panel C are calculated by a bootstrap procedure based
on 200 repetitions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.16: Weak Executive Constraints and Basins: Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping
Weak Executive Constraints, 1950–1965
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Convergent C-C mechanical 0.028
(0.019)
Convergent O-C thermal −0.047
(0.062)
Convergent O-C mechanical −0.018
(0.015)
Convergent O-O −0.036∗
(0.022)
Divergent thermal −0.003
(0.014)
Wrench mechanical 0.016
(0.012)
Divergent mechanical −0.003
(0.017)
Convergent C-C thermo-mechanical −0.020
(0.052)
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.184 0.175 0.183 0.187 0.172 0.184 0.172 0.172
Notes. See Table A.1 for variable deﬁnitions. e variable “weak constraints” is an indicator for having averaged three points or fewer out of seven on XCONST from 1950–1965.
A score of three points for XCONST indicates “slight to moderate limitation on executive authority” (Polity IV). In practice “weak constraints” indicates having an average
XCONST score equal to or below the median average XCONST score from 1950–1965. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous
area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.17: Weak Executive Constraints and Basins: Final Component of Code Grouping
Weak Executive Constraints, 1950–1965
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Foreland 0.001
(0.020)
Intracratonic sag 0.003
(0.011)
Passive margin −0.013
(0.012)
Convergent sag 0.000
(0.019)
Post-ri sag −0.004
(0.013)
Wrench 0.016
(0.012)
Extensional −0.010
(0.024)
Convergent wrench −0.032∗∗
(0.014)
Fore-arc −0.035∗∗
(0.017)
Ri −0.003
(0.017)
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.171 0.172 0.180 0.171 0.172 0.184 0.172 0.205 0.201 0.172
Notes. See Table A.1 for variable deﬁnitions. e variable “weak constraints” is an indicator for having averaged three points or fewer out of seven on XCONST from 1950–1965.
A score of three points for XCONST indicates “slight to moderate limitation on executive authority” (Polity IV). In practice “weak constraints” indicates having an average
XCONST score equal to or below the median average XCONST score from 1950–1965. All speciﬁcations include geographic controls (land area, coastline, and mountainous
area), climatic controls (tropical area and good soil area), and region ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.3 Figures
Figure A.1: First Stage
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Notes. e ﬁgure plots oil production residuals against the residuals from Basin, where the residuals are obtained
from separate regressions on the full set of geographic and climatic controls and region dummies.
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Figure A.2: Second Stage
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Notes. e ﬁgures plot outcome residuals against Oil Production predicted residuals. Each outcome residual
is obtained by regressing the outcome variable on the full set of geographic and climatic controls and region
dummies. e Oil Production predicted residuals are obtained by regressing the predicted values of Oil Production
from the ﬁrst stage on the full set of geographic and climatic controls and region dummies.
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Figure A.3: Endowment and Basin
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Notes. e ﬁgure plots oil endowment against Basin. e ﬁrst graph is a raw scaerplot where the residuals are
obtained from separate regressions on the full set of geographic and climatic controls and region dummies.
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Figure A.4: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.5: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.6: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Final Component of Code Grouping
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
-0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
Democracy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
-0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00
Avg. Democracy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Corruption
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
Internal Conflict
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
-0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010
Coup Attempts
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
-0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Purges
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
-0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
Total Revenue
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
# o
f In
str
um
en
ts
-0.20 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00
Tax Revenue
Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.7: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Final Component of Code Grouping
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.8: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping (Control-
ling for Percentage Muslim in 1950)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.9: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping (Control-
ling for Percentage Muslim in 1950)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.10: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Final Component of Code Grouping
(Controlling for Percentage Muslim in 1950)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.11: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Final Component of Code Grouping
(Controlling for Percentage Muslim in 1950)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.12: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping (Con-
trolling for Ethnic Fractionalization)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.13: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Tectonic-Subsidence Grouping (Con-
trolling for Ethnic Fractionalization)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.14: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Final Component of Code Grouping
(Controlling for Ethnic Fractionalization)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.15: 2SLS Estimates by Size of Instrument Set, Final Component of Code Grouping
(Controlling for Ethnic Fractionalization)
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Notes. is ﬁgure plots point estimates and 90-percent conﬁdence intervals for the coeﬃcient on oil production,
using optimal instrument sets of varying sizes. e gray, dashed line marks the value of the OLS estimate.
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Figure A.16: Suppression Decision
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Notes. e ﬁgure shows the eﬀect of a resource boom on the decision to suppress democracy in two diﬀerent
countries: one with weak executive constraints, θL , and the other with strong executive constraints, θH . In both
countries period-one rents increase from R1 to R
′
1, and period-two rents increase from R2 to R
′
2. e resource
boom is balanced from the perspective of the country with weak constraints. Democracy is repressed if and only
if (θ ,R′1) lies above the blue line in the ﬁrst graph (feasibility) and (θ ,R
′
2) lies above the blue line in the second
graph (desirability). Note that the increase in R2 causes the blue line in the feasibility graph to shi upward,
because it raises the reservation bribe of the rich group. In the country with weak constraints, the resource boom
leads to repression, while the country with strong constraints transitions to democracy.
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Figure A.17: Petroleum System
Source. Petrolia Haldimand Project.
Figure A.18: Peripheral Foreland and Passive Margin Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
Notes. e tan region is old sediments, and the light blue-green region is newer sediments.
88
A.3.1 Basins grouped by plate-tectonic environment and primary subsidence mechanism
Figure A.19: Basins: Convergent Continent-Continent Tectonics, Mechanical Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.20: Basins: Convergent Continent-Continent Tectonics, ermo-Mechanical Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.21: Basins: Convergent Ocean-Continent Tectonics, Mechanical Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.22: Basins: Convergent Ocean-Continent Tectonics, ermal Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.23: Basins: Convergent Ocean-Ocean Tectonics
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.24: Basins: Divergent Tectonics, Mechanical Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.25: Basins: Divergent Tectonics, ermal Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.26: Basins: Wrench Tectonics, Mechanical Subsidence
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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A.3.2 Basins grouped by ﬁnal component of Fugro Tellus code
Figure A.27: Foreland Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.28: Fore-Arc Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.29: Extensional Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.30: Convergent Sag Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.31: Convergent Wrench Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
101
Figure A.32: Ri Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.33: Intracratonic Sag Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.34: Post-Ri Sag Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.35: Passive Margin Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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Figure A.36: Wrench Basins
Source. Fugro Robertson, Ltd. (2013).
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